The decision of the Commissioner of Labour on the question of whether a person is employed within the meaning of the Madras Shops and Establishments Act, 1947, is not liable to be quashed by a writ of certiorari unless there is a manifest error apparent on the face of the record.

ORDER :- In February 1951, Prem Sagar, the second respondent, was holding a gazetted appointment with the Government of India as an Assistant Engineer. On 5-2-1951, he entered the service of the Standard Vacuum Oil Co., Madras, as a temporary Roads Engineer on a salary of Rs. 350. On 1-6-1952 he was promoted as Operating Engineer on a salary of Rs. 450 per month. In 1956 the designation of the post which he held was changed from Operating Engineer to Operations Assistant. But that did not affect him in any way. By the end of February, 1958 he was drawing a salary of Rs. 1,000/- per month.

2. In the affidavit filed in support of the petitions it is alleged that for sometime prior to August 1957, the work of the second respondent was unsatisfactory.

"He was un-co-operative, malingering and generally his productive capacity was below standard. This was made known to him in August 1957 and he was advised that improvement was necessary. In September 1957, his work was again reviewed and still found unsatisfactory. In view of this continued unsatisfactory performance he was placed on probation for a period of six months commencing from 1-10-1957. In February 1958 his progress was again reviewed and it was found that he did not have the capacity to exercise the full responsibilities of an operations Assistant. However, the calibre of his work was such as to indicate that he could probably satisfactorily handle the next lower position and he was accordingly offered a position as a Senior Operations Supervisor on a salary of Rs. 900 p. m. This decision was communicated to him on 21-2-1958. The second respondent did not object to the decision and went on leave till 30-4-1958. He however claimed to rejoin duty on 2-5-1958, as "operations Assistant" and in spite of being told he could not do so, persisted in his attitude. Since the second respondent would not accept the employment offered to him, his services were terminated with effect from 30-4-1958."

3. Against the order terminating his services the second respondent filed an appeal before the Commissioner for Workmens Compensation under S. 41 of the Madras Shops and Establishments Act, 1947. The petitioner company contended that the appeal was not maintainable as the second respondent held a position of management and was for that reason excluded from the categories of persons entitled to the protection conferred by the Act. Under S. 51 of the Act, the question was referred to the Commissioner of Labour, Madras. He held an enquiry and by an order which he made on 12-1-1959 he held that the second respondent did not fall within the category of persons referred to in S. 4(1)(a) of the Act and that therefore he was entitled to the protection conferred by the other provisions of the Act. W. P. No. 521 of 1959 has been filed for the issue of an appropriate writ to quash this decision of the Commissioner of Labour.

4. After the Commissioner of Labour had given his decision under S. 51 of the Act, the Additional Commissioner for Workmens Compensation completed his enquiry into the merits of the case and held that the termination of the services of the second respondent was not for a reasonable cause. In the result, the order of the Company terminating the services of the second respondent was set aside. W. P. No. 573 of 1959 has been filed for the issue of an appropriate writ to quash this decision of the Additional Commissioner for Workmens Compensation, Madras.

5. The first question that has to be decided is whether the Additional Commissioner for Workmens Compensation had jurisdiction in respect of the dispute between the petitioner company and the second respondent. In other words, is the second respondent a person entitled to the protection of the Madras Shops and Establishments Act, 1947. This question necessarily calls for an enquiry into what the learned Advocate General called the coverage of the Act. He argued that matter very fully and very elaborately and I shall try to summa