Starting point for limitation.

VEERASWAMI, J. :- The question in this second appeal is whether the suit filed by the respondent, beyond 12 years of his purchase of 17/24 shares out of the suit property from all but one co-sharer, for partition and separate possession of such shares is, in the absence of any proof of ouster by the co-sharer in possession of the entirety of the property, barred by limitation. The property originally belonged to one Kadar Mohideen Rowther, who died in 1915 leaving his widow, two sons of whom the defendant who is the appellant in this court was one, and two daughters. It is common ground that the appellant is entitled to 7/24 shares. The respondent purchased the remaining 17/24 shares from the relative co-owners on 18th October 1945. He instituted the instant suit, out of which this second appeal arises on 20th January 1958. The suit was resisted by the appellant on the main ground that it was out of time. On that question the courts below were disagreed, the lower appellate court expressing the view that the suit was within time. The appellant made a further plea claiming that he had since 18th October 1945, put up certain buildings on the suit property and had also effected repairs. Both the courts below have not accepted this claim except that in regard to repairs the first court found that the appellant was entitled to a sum of Rs. 194-14-0 on account of repairs effected at his expense. The lower appellate court did not specifically find on the point but had sufficiently expressed itself by stating that, if at all, the appellant had only effected certain repairs in the building that was already in existence at the time of his fathers death. When the second appeal by the defendant-appellant came before Kailasam, J. the learned Judge felt that a difficult question of law arose for decision and it was desirable that it was posted before a Division Bench.

2. As we mentioned at the outset, the sole point is whether the suit was barred by limitation. For the appellant the contention is that Art. 142 of the Limitation Act applies and that since the respondent failed to prove possession within 12 years of the suit, it was rightly dismissed by the trial court. We have no hesitation in rejecting the contention. Art. 142 contemplates a suit in which the claimant alleges possession and dispossession. Obviously this is not such a suit. It is nobodys case that the respondent, pursuant to his purchase in 1945, took possession of the undivided shares conveyed to him and he was dispossessed of the same subsequently. If that Article is ruled out as being inapplicable, can it be said that Art. 144 governs the suit ? The Article contemplates a suit for possession of immoveable property or any interest therein not otherwise specifically provided for. The starting point of limitation for the purpose of this Article, is the date when possession of the defendant becomes adverse to the plaintiff. The suit in this case was not one for possession simpliciter but for partition and separate possession of the fractional shares which the plaintiff had purchased. None of the Articles of the Limitation Act seems to directly take within it a suit of that nature. It is, however, obvious that the suit is also in a sense for recovery of immoveable property, though in order to grant that relief something has to precede that. It is only when the relief of partition is granted that it will be possible to divide the shares by metes and bounds and the shares conveyed to the plaintiff could be delivered to him. In as much as the prayers for partition and separate possession of an undivided share are composite in nature, we should confess that we would have felt some hesitation in holding that Art. 144 would apply to the suit had it not been for Thani Chetti v. Dakshinamurthi Mudaliar, 1955-1 Mad LJ 414 : ((S) AIR 1955 Mad 288). That was a case arising out of a suit instituted by a purchaser of a share of some of the coparceners of a Hindu Joint family claimi