Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, applies to all property possessed by a female Hindu, whether acquired before or after the commencement of the Act, and such property must be taken to have been held as full owner after the date when the Act comes into force.

JUDGMENT :- This second appeal by the defendant in a suit for possession, involves the application of section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act (Central Act XXX of 1956) to the admitted and established facts. The matter has a certain degree of interest. It appears to me that the result of the application would have to be somewhat different from that arrived at by both the Courts below, and that the appellant would hence be entitled to succeed to a partial extent.

2. The original owner of the suit properties was one Singara Konar who died in 1931. He left two widows behind him, namely, the first plaintiff (whose daughter is the second plaintiff), and one Poornathachi. The widows were unable to live together amicably, and, in consequence of a certain mediation, Poornathachi purported to execute a release deed in favour of the first plaintiff and her daughter (second plaintiff), under the original of Ex. A.I dated 29-4-1931. The effective part of this instrument has been set forth by the first appellate Court, in the original Tamil text, in paragraph 8 of its judgment. Actually, nothing very much turns upon the interpretation of the relevant clause. What Poornathachi said, with reference to the suit property, was that she would possess and enjoy, the property for her lifetime, paying government kist, and that after her, the first plaintiff and her daughter (the second plaintiff) were to take the properties.

3. The first Court thought that Pooranathachi actually acquired the property under this document and hence concluded that her interest was not enlarged into an absolute interest by virtue of section 14 of the Central Act No. XXX of 1956. It is not in dispute that, under sub-section (2) of section 14 of the Act, sub-section (1) is not applicable to "property acquired by way of gift or under a will or any other instrument or under a decree". But the first appellate Court rightly pointed out that it could not be stated as a proper inference, from the admitted facts, that Poornathachi acquired any interest in the suit property by virtue of this release deed. On the contrary, the facts were that the two widows were each entitled to an equal interest in the estate of the late Singara Konar, and that the document of release did not clothe the executant of that document (Poornathachi) with any new right. Further, as the learned counsel for the appellant rightly contends, Ex. A.1 is a release by Poornathachi in favour of the first plaintiff and her daughter. It is not a document to which the first plaintiff was a party, and it is not a simultaneous release by each of the two widows of any right or interest in favour of the other, being a unilateral document executed by Poornathachi alone, who does not purport to acquire any right or interest under that document it is difficult to say how the document could be said to fall within the scope of Section 14 (2) of the Act.

4. Sri Desikan for the respondents urges that a view of the transaction is possible as a family settlement and that, if this view is to prevail, then the case might fall within the exception enunciated by section 14 (2), so as to exclude the applicability of section 14 (1) of the Act. In this context, he draws my attention to Jaria Devi v. Shyam Sundar Agarwalla, 63 Cal WN 295 : (AIR 1959 Cal 338) but I notice that that was a case in which there was an actual family settlement, not allotting properties to the widow under any admitted share which could be related to the law of inheritance, but bequeathing to her an interest in certain properties, a life interest, by virtue of the document itself. That case is, therefore, entirely different, and the decision is not applicable to the present facts. It is not possible, in any view of the release deed, Ex. A-1, to regard it as any kind of settlement clothing the widow, Poornathachi, with any right to the suit property which she did not already have, and which could be derived from the document alone.

5. Hence, the point rath