Qualification and disqualification of the firm includes that of partners also.

ORDER :- By its order dated 24-5-1960 the Tribunal set aside the grant of a single permit to the petitioner and granted the same to the first respondent. The route is An-namalainagar to Kothamchari, which is a short route. This petition is to quash the Tribunals order.

2. The only point argued by Mr. Mohan Kumaramangalam for the petitioner is that the first respondent having applied for a permit as a firm but during the pendency of its appeal before the Tribunal, the firm having been dissolved by one of the two partners going out of it, the appeal became infructuous.

3. The argument so addressed is based on the assumption that the application was by a firm. Though it does not appear to have been noticed by either the Regional Transport Authority or the Tribunal and the parties proceeded on the footing that the application was by the firm Balasubramaniam and Co. on the actual verification of the original application it is found that the application was by M. Balasubramaniam, son of A. R. Muthiah Pillai. Whether the application was by a firm or by an individual will have to be decided by the terms themselves of the application. The form of the application should be as prescribed by the rules namely S.P.C.A.

As is evident from the form, the first column relates to the name of the applicant. Against this column the only name given is M. Balasubramanian, son of A. R. Mutniah Pillai. Column 2(a) relates to the "name of the father and the nature and extent of his financ. al interest in existing road transport undertaking." But this .column was left blank apparently because in column (1) the firms name has already been given. Clause (2) (b) requires information to be given in the case of partnership and registered or unregistered firm specifying the names of all persons constituting the body, the nature and extent of the financial interest of each of these persons in existing roaa transport undertaking. While filling up of this column it is stated "M. Balasubramaniam, managing partner and K. Natarajan, partner. Share capital Rs. 25,000 each. I have service experience as the manager for Lakshmi Bus service, Chidambaram."

4. Then comes the address column and the address is given as "M. Balasubramaniam and Co, No. 61 Malaikatti St, Chidambaram." The next two columns require mention about the particular route for which the permit is applied and the details of the vehicle. From the 8th column it is seen that no vehicle had been purchased at the time of the application. The payment as seen from the challan also was in the name of Balasubramaniam, managing partner. The application was signed as "M. Balasubramaniam, managing partner". Nowhere in the application does it appear that M. Balasubramaniam applied for and on behalf of the firm. From the information supplied against column 2(b) and the signing of the application as "M. Balasubramaniam, managing partner" alone, it cannot be inferred that the application itself was on behalf of the firm. If the application was not on behalf of the firm, as I am inclined to think it was not, the point of law urged by counsel for the petitioner does not fall to be considered.

5. But as a full argument has been addressed to me on the question, I think it but fair to deal with it. The contention is that where a firm of partnership applied for a permit but failed to get a permit in the first instance and appealed against the refusal and while the appeal was pending one of the partners went out with the result the firm stood dissolved, the appeal was at an end and no question of thereafter granting a permit to the firm or one of the quondam partners could arise.

Counsel for the petitioner recognised that a firm of partnership unlike an incorporated company, is not a legal entity distinct and different from the individual members composing it. A firm of partnership is but a creature of contract, its rights and liabilities depending on the terms thereof as well as the relevant statutory provisions governing