Sustainability of fresh application u/s 95 for compensation.

RAMACHANDRA IYER, C.J. :- This appeal, which is directed against the judgment of Balakrishna Aiyar, J. arises out of proceedings instituted by the appellant under S. 95, C. P. Code, for compensation against the respondent, for obtaining an order for attachment before judgment on insufficient grounds. The judgment of the learned Judge is reported in Kanthammal v. Rajalakshmi, 1960-2 Mad LJ 484 : (AIR 1961 Mad 352). The facts giving rise to the appeal are these :

2. The appellant Kanthammal and another person Kuppuswami Chetti borrowed certain money from one Ispahani in the year 1947 and executed a promissory note in respect of that liability. Ispahani assigned the promissory note to Rajalakshmi, the respondent herein but it is now found that it was Kanthammals money that was utilised for obtaining the assignment in her favour and the latter was in effect a benamidar for Kanthammal. Evidently, Kanthammal wanted not to have the promissory note discharged by payment and with a view to enforce the same against her co-debtor Kuppuswami Chetti, she adopted the device of obtaining an assignment of the promissory note in favour of the respondent. It has also been found that it was at the instance of the appellant, the respondent instituted a suit on the promissory note impleading the appellant as well as Kuppuswami Chetti. That suit, which was originally filed in this Court as C. S. No. 64 of 1951 was later transferred to the City Civil Court and registered there as O. S. No. 1694 of 1955. While the suit was pending in this Court, the respondent applied for attachment before judgment of certain moneys in deposit to the credit of Kanthammal in another suit. This conduct of the respondent is no doubt strange, for, as we stated earlier, she was only the alter ego of the appellant so far as that claim was concerned. It has been found by the learned Judge that the application for attachment before judgment was the result of misunderstandings which ensued between the appellant and the respondent subsequent to the institution of the suit. But that is by the way.

On 5-3-1952, there was an ex parte order for attachment. The appellant thereupon applied to this Court to have the attachment vacated. She then put forward her story in regard to the assignment of the promissory note and also that the suit by the respondent could not be sustained against her. Ramaswami, J. before whom the application for attachment before judgment came up for final orders, made absolute the interim order on the ground that there were sufficient grounds for the attachment. This order of the learned Judge is dated 29-1-1954. The suit, which was later transferred to the City Civil Court was disposed of on 1-11-1955, by which decision, the suit, so far as it was laid against the appellant, was dismissed; but there was a decree against Kuppuswami Chetti. Soon after the disposal of the suit, sometime in June 1956, the appellant filed the application out of which this appeal arises for compensation in respect of the wrongful attachment obtained by the respondent in regard to the moneys belonging to the appellant which were then in Court deposit, she having been deprived of the use of the money. This application was dismissed by the trial judge; the same has been upheld by Balakrishna Aiyar, J. on a question of limitation. The learned Judge was of the view that as the application was not filed within three years of the date of the obtaining of the order of attachment before judgment, it should he held to be barred by Art. 181 of the Limitation Act.

3. In this appeal, the appellant contests the correctness of the judgment on the ground that the true starting point for limitation under Art. 181 for application of this kind would be the date of disposal of the main suit and not the date on which the order for attachment before judgment was obtained. We consider it unnecessary to go into the question of limitation, as we are satisfied that the appellant will have no sustain