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1962 Supreme(Mad) 193

MADRAS HIGH COURT
RAMAKRISHNAN
Andal Ammal
Versus
Sivaprakasa Sethurayar and others
Second Appeal No. 1456 of 1959
Decided On : 12 July, 1962

Advocates Appeared:
R. Ramamurthi Aiyar, Yegnaraman and V. Swaminathan, for Appellants; K.S. Desikan, K. Raman, V. Jagatrakshaka Aiyangar and V. Meenakshi Sundaram, for Respondents.

Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, does not apply to a female who is only a trespasser, without any right to the property.

Headnote:

HINDU SUCCESSION ACT, 1956 - SECTION 14(1) - POSSESSION OF PROPERTY BY FEMALE HINDU - INTERPRETATION - ABSOLUTE RIGHTS - TRESPASSER - NO BENEFIT.

Fact of the Case:

The appellants, defendants 1 and 5 in a suit for declaration of title and possession of properties, challenged the finding of the lower courts that the plaintiffs were the nearest reversioners of the last male owner and that the first defendant, Andal Ammal, was not entitled to absolute rights in the properties under Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956.

Finding of the Court:

The court held that Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, which grants absolute rights to property possessed by a female Hindu, does not apply to a female who is only a trespasser, without any right to the property. The court found that Andal Ammal was in possession of the properties as a trespasser and, therefore, could not claim absolute rights under Section 14(1).

Issues: 1. Whether the plaintiffs were the nearest reversioners of the last male owner. 2. Whether the first defendant, Andal Ammal, was entitled to absolute rights in the properties under Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956.

Ratio Decidendi: The court interpreted Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, as applying only to female Hindus who have a limited estate in the property, which is then enlarged to an absolute estate under the Act. The court held that a trespasser, who does not have any right to the property, cannot claim absolute rights under Section 14(1).

Final Decision: The court dismissed the second appeal and upheld the decision of the lower courts that the plaintiffs were the nearest reversioners of the last male owner and that the first defendant was not entitled to absolute rights in the properties under Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956.

Judgement

JUDGMENT :- The appellants herein are the defendants 1 and 5 in O. S. 26 of 1958 on the file of the learned Subordinate Judge, Kumbakonam, a suit for declaration of the plaintiffs title to the plaint-schedule properties and for recovery of possession with past and future mesne profits. The prior facts necessary for a consideration of the second appeal can now be put down. The plaintiffs rely upon a genealogical tree appended to the plaint A schedule.

2. It is common ground that the suit properties were owned by Vaithilinga Sethurayar who died several years ago leaving behind a son, Kulandayya Veerayyan, widow Chinnathal, and a daughter, Kasturi Ammal. This Kulandayya Veerayyan died in 1900, unmarried. Therefore he was the last male owner of the properties. On his death Chinnathal succeeded to the properties. She lived to a good old age and died on 13-11-1955. Her daughter, Kasturi Ammal, predeceased her and Kasturi Ammals daughter, Andal Ammal is the first defendant. The plaintiffs relying on the genealogical tree abovementioned claim along with defendants 6 and 7 to be the nearest reversioners of the last male owner, minor Kulandayya Veerayyan. They filed the present suit in 1958, seeking for the recovery of possession of the property. They alleged that Andal Ammal is in possession of the bulk of the properties without having any right to them. The fifth defendant is the alienee of some items from Chinnathal. This sale deed is not binding on the plaintiffs as it was not supported by legal necessity, and by good and valid consideration. Defendants 2 and 4 are in possession of certain items of the plaint-schedule property, but their title would not prevail as against that of the plaintiff, in those items. Plaintiffs 1 and 4 are entitled to two-thirds share in the plaint-schedule properties, and the remaining one-third share belonged to defendants 6 and 7. Since the defendants 6 and 7 refused to join the plaintiffs, they have been impleaded as defendants.

3. The first defendant, Andal Ammal, denied that the plaintiffs were the nearest reversioners of the last male holder and asserted that they were not entitled to maintain the suit. The genealogical tree in the plaint A schedule is not correct. In the lifetime of Chinnathal, there were two suits filed by the reversioners for reliefs against her. In the earlier suit, O. S. Nos. 496 and 497 of 1906, on the file of the District Munsif, Tiruvayaru, the reversionery relationship shown by the plaint mentioned genealogical tree has been disbelieved and it is not proper for the plaintiffs to reagitate the matter once again No doubt, there was a subsequent suit filed by the reversioners in O. S. No. 245 of 1910, on the file of the District Munsif, Thiruvayaru where the relationship mentioned in the plaint A schedule genealogical tree was affirmed; but according to the first defendant, the decision in the earlier suit is the proper decision and should be relied upon. The first defendant asserted further that she has been in possession of most of the plaint schedule items ever since the death of her mother, Kasturi Ammal, in the year 1922, and by virtue of Act XXX of 1956, Chinnathal must be deemed to be the absolute owner. In any event, if Chinnathal is not to be considered as the absolute owner on the ground that she died prior to coming into force of Act XXX of 1956, the first defendant as a woman in possession would get absolute rights in the properties, under S. 14 (1) of the above Act. She also pleaded that the alienations challenged by the plaintiffs were for necessary purposes and were binding on the estate. During the pendency of the second appeal, a compromise was entered into between the appellants and respondents 3, 5 and 6 in the second appeal, who are the third plaintiff and the sixth and seventh defendants. But that compromise was stated to be subject to the result in the second appeal.

4. The principal question that arises in this suit is whether the plaintiffs have e














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