The relevant Article of the Limitation Act for a suit for refund of purchase money by an auction purchaser is Art. 96, and the starting point of limitation is the date of the plaintiff's knowledge of the mistake.

ANANTANARAYANAN, J. :- In this appeal by the first defendant, the primary question involved is one of limitation. In order to appreciate the background against which that issue arises, the following facts are essential.

2. The second defendant executed a simple mortgage with regard to certain properties in favour of the first defendant (appellant) for a sum of Rs. 4500 on 26-3-1930. The suit of the first defendant (O. S. No. 213 of 1945) was instituted to enforce that mortgage not merely against the mortgagor, but also two others who claimed to be in possession of the suit properties under an independent title. The preliminary mortgage decree exonerated those two persons. The matter came up to this Court in appeal in A. S. No. 125 of 1947 before Satyanarayana Rao and Chandra Reddi, JJ. and the following passage from that judgment of the Bench is of some interest upon the history of the title :

It appears that Ramaswamis wife, after death of Ramaswami, instituted a suit in which it was decided that the release deed executed by her did not convey any interest to the first defendant and that was valid only to convey the rights of management of the estate of Ramaswami to the first defendant. From this decision, it is possible to argue that the first defendant had no interest in the suit property and that he had no right to mortgage it. There were subsequent complications adverted to by the learned trial Judge in paragraph 10 of his judgment; but with reference to those facts there is no evidence, there is no pleading, there is no issue and there is no proof. It is therefore unnecessary to go into the question whether the first defendant had any interest in the suit property when he hypothecated it, or whether he had subsequently acquired any interest in it by any valid transaction." At one stage of the arguments before us. Sri Gopalaswami Aiyangar for the first defendant (appellant) sought to argue that the mortgagor (the first defendant referred to in the above passage from the judgment in A.S. No. 125 of 1947) subsequently acquired rights to the property, and that by some analogous application of the doctrine of feeding the estoppel, it must be held that there was a right title and interest in the judgment-debtor which could have passed by the sale in favour of the auction purchaser. But this point is purely academic, since the subsequent events have rendered it clear that no such plea is now open to the mortgagee-decree-holder (appellant). For, what happened was that, after the final decree, the properties were brought to sale and sold in favour of the plaintiff (respondent) for over Rs. 22,000, which sale was confirmed in November 1952.

3. When the plaintiff attempted to take delivery through Court, he could not obtain delivery because of the obstruction of the lessees in possession, the third parties who were exonerated in O. S. No. 216 of 1945, earlier referred to. His application (E. A. No. 1420 of 1952) for removal of obstruction was also dismissed. A revision was unsuccessful, and the plaintiff (respondent) filed O. S. No. 213 of 1955 to set aside the summary order in E. A. No. 1420 of 1952 as provided for by the processual law. That suit was dismissed, and there was a definite finding, which has become final, that the second defendant (mortgagor) had no right, title or interest in the property, and no possessory interest even, so that the auction purchaser (plaintiff) acquired no rights at all under the Court sale.

In the meantime, what had happened was that the mortgagee-decree-holder (first defendant) applied for cheque and drew a sum of over Rs. 10,000 in full satisfaction of his decree. The plaintiff (respondent) in the present suit claims a refund of the amount, on the ground that the judgment-debtor had no right, title or interest of any kind in the properties, that no such right or title passed by virtue of the Court sale, even to the most minute degree, and that the common law permitted the institution of su