A universal donee is a legal representative of the donor and is personally liable to the extent of the properties comprised in the gift for all debts due by the donor at the time of the gift. Therefore, a decree-holder can levy execution straightway against the universal donee to the extent of the donor's properties in their hands without instituting a separate suit.

JUDGMENT :- This second appeal by the defendants arises out of a claim suit instituted by the respondent. He was a creditor of one Bhaktavatsala under a promissory note executed by him and he had obtained a decree on that footing during his lifetime. Bhaktavatsala got divided from his sons and the properties which had been allotted to his share were settled by him on the defendants, of whom the second was his concubine and the first his illegitimate son by her. The lower appellate Court differing from the trial Court has found that the settlement in favour of the defendants comprised the entire properties which Bhaktavatsala owned at the time and that the defendants, therefore, are universal donees.

2. The respondent in execution attached one of the properties covered by the settlement but the defendants claim on the basis of the settlement was allowed. The respondent was, therefore, driven to file a suit out of which this second appeal arises. The trial Court found that the settlement deed was valid and acted upon and that the defendants were not universal donees. On that view, it dismissed the suit. On appeal by the respondent, the lower appellate Court, as I have already mentioned, considered the defendants to be universal donees and as regards the validity of the settlement deed its view was that it was in fraud of the creditors although the only debt owed by Bhaktavatsala at the time of the settlement or even earlier at the time of the partition between himself and his sons was that due to the respondent. The lower appellate Court, therefore, allowed the appeal and decreed the suit. That is how the defendants have come up to this Court in second appeal.

3. It is contended for the appellants that the defendants under the settlement could not be regarded as universal donees. The basis for this argument is a recital in the settlement deed that the properties which the donor might after the execution of the document acquire and the other "remaining properties" should also be taken by the donees. The lower appellate Court on the evidence before it came to the conclusion that this recital did not means that the settlement was not in regard to the entirety of the properties possessed by Bhaktavatsala at the time he executed the document. In coming to that conclusion it was also aware of the fact that no other property was shown to have been acquired subsequently or left by Bhaktavatsala. In my opinion the lower appellate Court was right in its view that the settlement of Bhaktavatsala constituted the defendants as universal donees.

4. The next contention for the appellants is that even if they are regarded as universal donees, the respondent, without instituting a suit against them on the basis of the donors debt, could not levy execution straightway against the properties conveyed under the settlement. Muhamathu Kunju v. Muhammathu Kunju, AIR 1952 Trav Co. 23 on which reliance is placed does appear to support this proposition. The learned Judges in that case held that universal donees could not be regarded as legal representatives within the meaning of the definition of the term in the Civil Procedure Code and that the only remedy of the decreeholder was to institute a suit against the universal donees. One of the reasons why they thought that a sum was the only remedy was that the universal donees themselves were not parties to the decree, sought to be executed. The fact that the learned Judges placed reliance upon Thiagaraja v. Narayanaswami, AIR 1938 Mad 684 also shows that they did not think that there was any difference in principle between a transferee of a part or the properties of the judgment debtor and a case or universal donees. In AIR 1938 Mad 684, Horwill, J. was not concerned with a universal donee and observed therefore that S. 52 C.P.C. did not give the creditor a right to proceed against the property which was no longer in the hands of the judgment debtor and to proceed against a transferee, he must estab