1. The sole point for our determination in this second appeal is, whether or not the suit is based on a contract in writing, within Article 116 of the Limitation Act. If it is, the claim is not barred. If it is not, the claim is barred. The facts found are that the landlord entered into a contract with the appellants then representative in 1880, having agreed to lease to the latter certain lands for rent, and that in pursuance of such lease the lessee entered on the lands, but allowed the rent to fall into arrears.

2. The lessee executed and had registered a document in which he acknowledged his lessorss title, and the agreement to hold on the terms stated, but the lessor executed no instrument agreeing on his part to allow the lessee to hold as such.

3. It appears then clear that the contract cannot be said to be a contract in writing," within the meaning of the words used in Article 116, Schedule II, of the Limitation Act. Part of the contract is in writing in the sense that the lessee has executed an instrument evidencing his liability under the contract, but there is no written evidence of the contract on the part of the lessor.

4. It is easy to see what might be the resul