The main legal principle established in the judgment is the distinction between a single and continuing breach of the covenant for quiet enjoyment, and its impact on the statute of limitation.

Coutts Trotter, J.

1. This is an appeal by the Secretary of State for India in Council against a judgment of the District Judge of Godavari awarding to the plaintiff a sum of Rs. 14,000 by way of damages. The facts of the case are comparatively simple, though the questions for determination are complex and difficult. The plaintiff in March 1896 acquired from the Collector of Godavari district acting as Agent for the Government, a patta or lease of a piece of land called the Sidhantam Lanka at an annual kist of Rs. 6,010 for a period of five years. These lankas are islands formed in the bed of the river Godavari by the silting up of solid matters brought down by its waters. They are pursue any remedy in damages which that finding might entitle him to. At the same time Government was allowed by the learned Judges to take the point of limitation which had not been raised by them at the first hearing. The case accordingly went back to the District Court, and the then District Judge, Mr. Parthasarathi Ayyangar, dealt with the two issues of limitation and of the quantum of damages, and he decided both in favour of the plaintiff. The Government have appealed from that decision, and the only question that we are called upon to decide relates to their plea of limitation. Under that plea there are two questions for decision: First whether the plaintiffs cause of action arose more than six years before suit was brought; and secondly whether if it did, there has been an acknowledgment sufficient to take the case out of the statute. It was suggested by the learned Government Pleader that in order to have the benefit of the latter contention, the plaintiff should have set it up either by amending his plaint or putting in a further statement in the nature of a reply alleging the acknowledging and specifying the document or documents containing it. Having regard to the circumstances in which Government was allowed to avail itself of the plea of limitation, we are not disposed to give effect to the suggestion and are prepared to treat the plaint as amended by the addition of the necessary averments. Indeed on our intimation to that effect during the course of the argument the learned Government Pleader very properly did not press the point.

2. To determine the first point as to whether the plaintiffs case is prima facie barred by limitation, it is necessary to see what is the exact nature of the plaintiffs cause of action. In the course of an interesting argument in which I received the greatest assistance from both the learned Counsel, a great many authorities were referred to, and the history of the various covenants suggested to be applicable to the case was to some extent investigated. The Transfer of Property Act does not apply to Crown grants, but Section 108 of that Act sets out in a convenient form the implied contracts usually subsisting from lessor to lessee as follows:

(b) The lessor is bound on the lessees request to put him in possession of the property: (c) The lessor shall be deemed to contract with the lessee that, if the latter pays the rent reserved by the lease and performs the contracts binding on the lessee, he may hold the property during the time limited by the lease without interruption.

3. The latter of these implied contracts corresponds to the familiar covenants for quiet enjoyment of English law. Into the history of the former I will enquire presently. It is quite clear that the obligation to put the lessee in possession of the property was broken quoad the 109 acres in dispute in July 1896, and that that cause of action which the plaintiff undoubtedly possessed is barred by limitation. But it is argued on his behalf that he has a separate remedy in respect of the same failure to put him in possession under the contract for quiet enjoyment. It is argued that the contract for quiet enjoyment subsists throughout the lease, and that its breach is a continuing one, the remedy for which was available to the plaintiff