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IN THE HIGH COURT OF MARAS
S Aiyar, Napier
P.S. Sivarama Aiyar
Versus
Muthu K.R. Alagappa Chetty By His
Decided On : 6 September, 1915
Transfer of Property Act - Lease Determination - The court declined to restrict the interpretation of 'some act showing intention to determine the lease' to re-entry or filing of suit in ejectment, holding that the plaintiff's notice unequivocally showing intention to determine the lease was sufficient.
Fact of the Case:
The appellants contended that the expression 'some act showing intention to determine the lease' in Section 111, Clause (g) of the Transfer of Property Act should be confined to re-entry or filing of suit in ejectment. They also argued that the 2nd defendant was not liable for rent or compensation for use and occupation.
Finding of the Court:
The court held that the general phrase 'some act' should not be restricted to re-entry or filing of suit in ejectment, and the plaintiff's notice unequivocally showing intention to determine the lease was sufficient. The 2nd defendant was held liable for mesne profits as a person in illegal occupation.
Issues: Interpretation of 'some act showing intention to determine the lease' in Section 111, Clause (g) of the Transfer of Property Act, liability of the 2nd defendant for rent and compensation for use and occupation.
Ratio Decidendi: The court declined to restrict the interpretation of 'some act showing intention to determine the lease' to re-entry or filing of suit in ejectment, and held that the plaintiff's notice unequivocally showing intention to determine the lease was sufficient. The 2nd defendant was held liable for mesne profits as a person in illegal occupation.
Final Decision: The appeal failed and was dismissed with costs.
1. The first contention, of the appellants learned Vakil is that the expression "some act showing his" (lessors) intention to determine the lease", occurring; in Section 111, Clause (g), of the Transfer of Property Act must be confined to an attempt at re-entry, or to the filing of suit in ejectment, where the forfeiture is incurred by the breach of a condition of the lease-deed providing for re-entry on such breach. We must decline to put such a restricted construction on the very general phrase some act occurring in the Statute. The Lawyers notices by the plaintiff in this case showing unequivocally his intention to determine the lease are, therefore, sufficient.
2. The next contention is that the appellant (2nd defendant) is not liable for rent, or to pay compensation for use and occupation, because he was neither the plaintiffs tenant, for did he continue in possession with the plaintiffs permission. The short answer to this contention is that he has been made liable for mesne profits as a person in illegal occupation and not as a tenant, permissive or otherwise.
3. Lastly, the learned Judge was right in making the 2nd defendant liable for mesne profits at Rs. 200 a month on his own admissions (see his evidence and his written statement in this case) that he has continued in possession of the same premises for which he had agreed to pay Rs. 200 rent to the 1st defendant.
4. The appeal, therefore, fails and is dismissed with costs.
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