The main legal point established in the judgment is that under Mitakshara law, succession is to be traced from the last male holder, and claims of joint family property and right of survivorship must be supported by specific provisions of the law.

Muttusami Ayyar, J.

1. The contest in this appeal is as to the right of succession to the zamindari of Shivagunga. Dora Singha Tevar was the last male holder, respondent is his son and appellant is the son of Kattama Natchi-yar, Dora Singhas predecessor, Appellant is related to the istimrar zamindar as daughters son and respondent as the son of a senior daughters son. The question for determination is whether, under the Mitakshara law, succession is to be traced from the last male holder or the istimrar zamindar. The first and third to sixth issues recorded in this case relate rather to the different grounds on which appellant presses his claim than to independent questions.

2. As regards the first issue, viz., whether succession is to be traced from the last male holder or his maternal grandfather, appellants contention is that when a person succeeds to an obstructed heritage, that person is not, whether a male or female, a full owner. There is, however, no warrant for it in the Mitakshara. The general rule of Hindu law is that when a male heir succeeds a male owner, the former is as much full owner as the latter, the principle being, as stated by Manu in chapter IX, verse 187, that to the nearest sapinda the inheritance belongs. The only recognized exception to it is that when a female, such as a widow or daughter, succeeds a male owner, her succession is a case of interposition between him and his next sapinda, on the authority of Catyayana, who directs that, upon the death of such female, the last male owners (and not her own) heirs shall take the heritage. This text is referred to, and the history of the introduction in the Mitakshara of widow and daughter among heirs is explained in the decision of this Court in Muttu Vaduganadha Tevar v. Dora Singha Tevar I.L.R., 3 Mad., 330, 331. As for obstructed and unobstructed heritage (sapratibanda and apratibanda), the distinction is material only to the extent that, in the one case, the nearer male heir excludes the more remote, whilst in the other, the doctrine of representation excludes this rule of preference. It is founded upon the theory that the spiritual benefit derived from three lineal male descendants, such as son, grandson and great-grandson, is the same, though among collateral male heirs, the quantum of such benefit varies in proportion to the remoteness of the male heir from the deceased male owner. Hence it is that the text of Yajnavalcya, cited in Mitakshara, chapter II, Section 1, verses 2 and 3, premises the death of a male owner without male issue, and enumerates his heirs in the order in which they are entitled to succeed, adding that on failure of the first in the order in which they are enumerated, the next in order is the proper heir. Thus the rule that to the nearest sapinda the inheritance belongs applies alike whether the heritage is obstructed or unobstructed, with this difference, viz., that when the last full owner leaves sons, grandsons and great-grandsons, their sapinda relationship confers equal spiritual benefit on him, though their blood relationship is not the same, and that they are all co-heirs within the meaning of the rule. The decision of the Subordinate Judge on the first issue is, therefore, correct.

3. The third issue is whether, upon the death of Kattama Natchiyar, the zamindari devolved upon Dora Singha Tevar and appellant as joint family property, and whether, upon the death of the former, it devolves upon the latter by right of survivorship. It is suggested for appellant, first, that it is joint family property; and, secondly, that his right of survivorship excludes respondent from succession. The right of survivorship, as recognized by the Mitakshara, presupposes two things, viz., a subsisting coparcenary in respect of the property in litigation, and the death of the last male owner without male issue. In the case before us, respondent is Dora Singha Tevars son, and even assuming that the estate was common both to appellant an