The main legal point established in the judgment is the wide scope of the term 'documents' in Section 17 of the Registration Act and the necessity of registration for all documents creating rights in immovable property.

Napier, J.

1. The question raised in this second appeal is whether the four letters A, B, C and D, or alternatively, the two letters A and B require registration under Sections 17 and 49 of the Registration Act, Section 17, Sub-Section (1) requires that "the following documents shall be registered," namely, among them Clause (a) "bases of immovable property from year to year, or for any term exceeding one year, or reserving a yearly rent. "Under the definition Section Sub-Section 7" lease includes an agreement to lease." There is a proviso to Section 17, Sub-section 2 which excepts some documents which would otherwise come under Clauses (b) and (c) and also distinguishes certain classes of documents which might otherwise have been thought to fall under either of those two classes. One of these clauses is (5) "any document not itself creating etc. any right, title, etc. but merely creating a right to obtain another document which will when executed create such right, etc." It has been held by a Full Bench of this Court in Narayanan Chetty v. Muthiah Servai (1910) I.L.R. 35 M. 63. s.c. 21 M.L.J. 41 that as Clause (5) has not been applied by Sub-Section (2) to leases the legislature must have had in its mind that documents with regard to leases cannot "merely create a right to obtain another document" and so are unsuited for the application of Clause 5 and that the fact of their exclusion from that clause and the specific inclusion of agreements to lease among leases in the definition section indicates that agreements so long as they settle the terms of the lease or leases, whether they contemplate the creation of another document or not, are leases within the meaning of Section 2, That decision is of course binding on Rs. It is of the greatest importance in considering the question raised in this appeal because if the contention for the appellant is correct it will be perfectly easy to create valid leases without the necessity for registration. Where the legislature has desired to exclude documents creating particular rights it has specifically mentioned them. (Vide several clauses to Sub-section 2). Subject to those exceptions the policy indicated by Section 17 is that all other documents creating rights in immovable property as distinguished from documents merely entitling parties to obtain a document creating such rights should be registered. Mr. K.N. Aiya, however, relies on certain cases which have put a limited construction on Section 17. His argument is that the words in Section 17 Sub-section (1) the following documents only apply to cases where the right is created by a single instrument. The first answer to that contention is that the word instrument has been omitted from Sub-section 1(d) although it appears in the other clauses of the sub-section. It is not, "instrument of lease" as we have "instrument of gift," but "lease." This difference of language has not, as far as I am aware, been noted in any of the decided cases. The next answer is that the word documents in the section is certainly of itself wide enough to cover more than one letter creating a lease. Certainly there is authority for the proposition, but I am unable to accede to it. On principle there can be no reason why an agreement for lease created by a letter setting out the terms and endorsed accepted should require registration and the same transaction embodied in two letters should not, and I cannot see where the practical difficulty lies in registering two or more letters constituting the contract. The authority relied on is an unreported case of this court, Appeal No. 201 of 1908 where the learned Judges rely on certain other cases for the proposition that if there is no one instrument which can be regarded as a lease, then Section 17 has no application. I have examined those cases, which are relied on by the appellant before us also, and with the very greatest deference to the learned Judges I do not think they support the proposition. One o