The main legal point established in the judgment is that a tenant is estopped from denying the landlord's title if the tenant has been let into possession or has acknowledged the landlord by executing a lease or paying rent. The tenant's execution of a lease or payment of rent is prima facie proof of the landlord's title, unless the tenant can prove ignorance, fraud, misrepresentation, or coercion.

Abdur Rahim, Officiating C.J.

1. The question referred to us is in these terms:--Whether a tenant who has executed a lease but has not been let into possession by the lessor is estopped from denying his lessors title in the absence of proof that he executed the lease in ignorance of the defect in his lessors title or that his execution of the lease was procured by fraud, misrepresentation or coercion? Mr. Justice Coutts Trotter, one of the learned Judges who made the reference, is of opinion that a tenant is altogether estopped from denying the title of the landlord who has let him into possession. So far there can be no doubt as to the law in India or in England. Section 116 of the Indian Evidence Act which says " No tenant of immovable property, or person claiming through such tenant, shall, during the continuance of the tenancy, be permitted to deny that the landlord of such tenant had, at the beginning of the tenancy, a title to such immovable property" is quite clear on the point. It does not recognise any exception exempting from the operation of estoppel cases in which the tenant was either ignorant of his landlords title or was induced by fraud or misrepresentation to enter upon the tenancy. It is only when the tenancy ceases, that he is free to deny the landlords title, but not till then. Their Lordships of the Privy Council in Bilas Kunwar v. Desraj Ranjit Singh 2, say " Section 116 of the Indian Evidence Act is perfectly clear on the point and rests on the principle well established by many English cases, that a tenant who has been let into possession cannot deny his landlords title however defective it might be, so long as he has not openly restored possession by surrender to his landlord."

2. But it has been argued before us on behalf of the plaintiff landlord, firstly, that Section 116 is not confined to cases where the tenant has been let into possession by the landlord whose title he seeks to deny and alternatively, in the next place, that the section is not exhaustive of the law of estoppel between tenant and landlord. As to the first contention, I entertain no doubt that the landlord whose title the tenant is estopped from denying is only the person from whom the tenant derived his tenancy and not his predecessor-in-title. Does the section then apply to a case where the tenant has been in possession of the land before the date of the acquisition of his title by the landlord 2 The words "at the beginning of the tenancy " do not in my opinion refer to the commencement of the particular lease or contract between the tenant and the landlord, but to the beginning of the occupation of the land by the tenant or by the person through whom he claims. If I am right in thinking that the estoppel enunciated in Section 116 is absolute in its nature and we were to apply it in favour of a landlord who has a derivative title and did not let the tenant into possession but to whom the tenant attorned either by executing a lease or paying rent, then we should be laying down a proposition which goes further than the law on the subject in England. In Woodfalls Law of Landlord and Tenant, page 249, 19th edition, the law in England is thus stated. " The rule that a tenant may not dispute his landlords title applies only to the title of the landlord who let him in " and this is how I understand the observation of the Judicial Committee in Bilas Kunwar v. Desrqj Runjit Singh (1915) I.L.R 37 A. 557 at p. 567 as to the scope of Section 116.

3. The argument that Section 116 is not exhaustive on the question of tenants estoppel cannot in my opinion be accepted. In Sarat Chunder Dey v. Gopal Chunder Laha (1892) I.L.R. 20 C. 296 the Judicial Committee dealing with a case of estoppel by conduct has ruled that the question must be determined with reference to Section 115 of the Evidence Act though they proceeded to point out that it did not enact anything different from the law in England. But however useful it might be to refer to Engl