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1917 Supreme(Mad) 6

IN THE HIGH COURT OF MARAS
Oldfield, Bakewell
Venkataswami Naidu
Versus
Shanmugam Pillai
Decided On : 10 January, 1917

The expression 'rejecting an application' in Order XLIII, Rule 1(d) signifies an immediate rejection and not a conditional or prospective rejection.

Headnote:

Order XLIII, Rule 1(d) - Immediate Rejection Interpretation - The court held that the expression 'rejecting an application' signifies an immediate rejection and not a conditional or prospective rejection, based on the principle laid down in previous judgments and the duty of the District Munsif to adjourn the case in order to take security.

Fact of the Case:

The court found that the expression 'rejecting an application' in Order XLIII, Rule 1(d) signifies an immediate rejection and not a conditional or prospective rejection, and remanded the case to the District Munsif for a final order.

Finding of the Court:

The court analyzed the interpretation of the expression 'rejecting an application' and concluded that it signifies an immediate rejection, based on previous judgments and the duty of the District Munsif to adjourn the case in order to take security.

Issues: Interpretation of the expression 'rejecting an application' in Order XLIII, Rule 1(d)

Ratio Decidendi: The expression 'rejecting an application' signifies an immediate rejection and not a conditional or prospective rejection, based on the duty of the District Munsif to adjourn the case in order to take security and previous judgments.

Final Decision: The Letters Patent Appeal is allowed and the case is remanded to the District Munsif for a final order.

JUDGMENT

1. We are of opinion that the expression "rejecting an application" in Order XLIII, Rule 1(d), signifies an immediate rejection and not a conditional or prospective rejection. The latter interpretation would lead to the dilemma pointed out under similar circumstances in Nannhu Mal v. Gulabo 26 A. 173 : A.W.N. (1903) 225.

2. We respectfully agree with the principle laid down in the judgment of the Allahabad High Court in Jagarnath Sahi v. Kamta Prashad 23 Ind. Cas. 138 : 36 A. 77 at p. 79 : 12 A.L.J. 38. We think that it was the duty of the District Munsif to adjourn the case in order to take security and only to pass final orders after the party had tendered or failed to furnish sufficient security, and that the order made may be construed as contemplating further proceedings on the application. The decisions of this Court under the Succession Certificate Act (VII of 1889), Venkataswami Naik v. Chinna Narayana Naik 5 M.L.J. 28 and Ariya Pillai v. Thangammal 20 M. 442 : 7 Ind. Dec. (N.S.) 313, were prior to the present Rules of Practice of 1905. The Letters Patent Appeal is allowed and the case, is remanded to the District Munsif in order that a final order may be passed, and in so doing he will provide for the costs of the petitioner in the District Court and here.

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