Seshagiri Aiyar, J.

1. Mr. Ramadoss bas again raised the question whether the consent of the next presumptive reversioner is conclusive evidence of an alienation having been made by a widow for justifiable necessity. He is justified in the state of the authorities in raising it.

2. Speaking for myself, I see no reason to re-consider my decision in Nachiappa Gounden v. Rangasami Gounden 26 Ind. Cas. 757: 28 M. L. J. 1: (1915) M. W. N. 53: 2 L. W. 69: 17 M. L. T. 87 (P. C.), It is not because I am unwilling to go back upon my views that I say this, but because the later pronouncements of the Judicial Committee on the question are not in conflict with what I then said. Two decisions of that Tribunal have been quoted before us. In Hari Kishen Bhagat v. Kashi Parshad Singh 27 Ind. Cas. 674: 42 C. 876: 17 M. L. T. 115: 19 C. W. N. 370: 13 A. L. J. 223: 2 L. W. 219: 21 C. L. J. 225: 28 M. L. J. 565: 17 Bom. L. R. 426: (1915) M. W. N. 511: 421. A. 64 (P. C), the expression "stringent equity" was used by the Board. A good deal of discussion has been directed to explain its meaning. It is said, that by these words the Judicial Committee intended to lay down that the consent rendered th