The main legal point established in the judgment is that a court of inferior jurisdiction has the jurisdiction to set aside a compromise decree obtained in a court of superior jurisdiction on the ground of fraud, and to declare the previous decree as of no effect.

Spencer, J.

1. The question that has been argued in this Letters Patent Appeal is whether it is competent to a Court of inferior jurisdiction to entertain a suit to declare a compromise decree obtained in a Court of superior jurisdiction to be not binding on the plaintiff as having been obtained by fraud. The plaintiff asked in his plaint not only for a declaration that the decree in O.S. No. 20 of 1914 on the file of the District Court of Coimbatore was not binding on him but also that it should be set aside and that the said suit should be retried and decided on the evidence. The District Munsif to whom the plaint was presented held that he had no jurisdiction to go into the question whether the former decree was obtained by fraud and that only an Appellate Court or a court transferring a suit from one court to another would have the power to direct a retrial. The District Judge, who heard an appeal from the District Munsifs decision, was of opinion that a court of inferior jurisdiction could not either set aside or order a re-hearing of a suit tried by a court of superior jurisdiction.

2. The learned Judge of this Court, who disposed of a petition to revise, the District Judges order, gave as his reason for refusing to interfere in the matter that the suit as originally instituted was not within the pecuniary jurisdiction of the District Munsif, although the amount involved in the compromise decree was.

3. There seems to have been a considerable misapprehension as to the course that the court trying the question of fraud would have to follow if it decided in the plaintiffs favour. As observed in Vijaya Ramayya v. Venkata Subba Row (1916) I.L.R. 39 M. 853 at page 873 : 30 M.L.J. 465 it would be sufficient for the court to declare that the previous decree was of no effect so far as he was concerned. Their Lordships remarked, in that case that the trial of the suit, which has been improperly compromised, after a declaration to that effect would no doubt proceed" if a proper application were made to the proper court. They refused in second appeal to make any order as to that. Ho here, the fact that the plaintiff asked for two reliefs which could not in the nature of things be granted was no reason for not deciding whether he was entitled to the declaration which he demanded if he proved that the compromise was fraudulent.

4. Next as regards the powers of the District Munsif to try a suit brought for a declaration that a decree obtained in the District Court was obtained by fraud, Section 9 of the Civil Procedure Code runs thus: "The courts shall (subject to the provisions herein contained) have jurisdiction to try all suits of a civil nature excepting suits of which their cognizance is either expressly or impliedly barred." The respondent has not shown that there is any express or implied bar to such a suit as this. Under Section 56 Clause (b) of the Specific Relief Act, a court has no power to stay proceedings in a court not subordinate to it; but there is no such limit placed by Section 42 on a court that has other wise jurisdiction over the suit making a declaration as to a plaintiffs title to a legal right and granting a permanent injunction against the decree-holder executing his fraudulent decree against the plaintiff.

5. If it were only the court which possessed the jurisdiction to try the suit in which the fraud was committed that could entertain a question whether a decree so obtained was vitiated by fraud, there would be no relief by suit under Article 95, Limitation Act, for parties aggrieved by fraud perpetrated in the trial of Small Cause suits or of rent suits in revenue courts or in appeals to the Privy Council, however gross the fraud. In Nistarini Dassi v. Nundoo Lal Bose (1899) I.L.R. 26 Cal. 891, Stanley, J., quoting from Shedden v. Patrick (1854) 1 Maoq. H.L.C. 607, observed, "It matters not whether the impeached judgment has been pronounced by an inferior tribunal or by the highest court of judicature in