The main legal point established in the judgment is that a Hindu widow forfeits her deceased husband's estate on re-marriage, as supported by the principles of Hindu Law, the interpretation of relevant acts and texts, and historical decisions.

Wallis, C.J.

1. I agree with the conclusion of Krishnan, J., in his Order of Eeference that, independently of Section 2 of Act XV of 1856, the widow of a Hindu forfeits her husbands estate on re-marriage. This was in my opinion decided by this Court in Murugayi v. Viramakali (1877) I.L.R. 1 Mad. 226, a decision which, as I shall show, has been repeatedly approved in this and other High Courts. That decision did not, as was contended before us, proceed on any proof of a custom of forfeiture on re-marriage in the particular caste, but on general principles of Hindu Law, though in support of its conclusion the Court referred, as the Bombay Court did in a later case, to the fact that the extensive enquiry the results of which are recorded in Steeles Hindu Castes showed that among the very numerous classes of Hindus who practised re-marriage in the Deccan such a forfeiture was an invariable incident of re-marriage. Following and relying on the decision of this Court, Wilson and Banerji, JJ. Matungini Gupta v. Ram Rutton Roy (1891) I.L.R. 19 Cal. 289 in their Orders of Reference, to which they adhered in their subsequent judgments, expressed the opinion that Section 2 of Act XV of 1856 was merely declaratory, and the same view was expressed in Rasul Jehan Begum v. Ram Surun Singh (1895) I.L.R. 22 Cal. 589 and by Ranade, J. delivering the judgment of the Pull Bench of the Bombay Court in Vithu v. Govinda (1896) I.l.R. 23 Bom. 321. In Har Saran Das v. Nandi (1889) I.L.R. 11 All. 330, which was followed in Ranjit v. Radha Rani (1898) I.L.R. 20 All. 476 it was held that a widow who according to the custom of her caste was entitled to re-marry did not forfeit her husbands estate on remarriage on the ground that the case was not governed by Section 2 of Act XV of 1856. The contention that the estate was liable to forfeiture independently of the section was not raised in those cases. When it was raised by Pandit Sundar Lall in Gajadhar v. Kaunsilla (1908) I.L.R. 31 All. 161 Stanley, G. J., and Bannerji, J., were inclined to accept it but for the earlier decisions, as to which they again expressed their doubts in Mula v. Partab (1909) I.L.R. 32 All. 489. Abdul Aziz Khan v. Nirma (1913) I.L.R 35 All. 466 only followed the earlier decisions without comment. The decision in Murugayi v. Viramakali (1877) I.L.R. 1 M. 226 has therefore been approved by the Calcutta and Bombay Courts, and would have been approved by Stanley, C.J., and Bannerji, J., in Allahabad but for the earlier decisions of that Court. I think we should be very slow to interfere with a decision which has stood so long and is supported by so much authority, and with great respect I cannot agree with the conclusion of a Bench of this Court in Second Appeal No. 1510 of 1916, (1918) M.W.N. 274 : 23 M.L.T. 81 : 44 I.C. 299 that it must be considered to have been overruled by the decision of the Privy Council in Moniram Kolita v. Keri Kolitani (1880) I.L.R. 5 Cal 776 that a Hindu widow does not forfeit her widows estate by reason of unchastity committed after succeeding to the estate. In Matungim, Gupta v. Ram Rutton Roy (1891) I.L.R. 19 Cal. 289 that contention was overruled by Wilson and Bannerji, JJ. with whom I respectfully agree. No. question of re-marriage was raised before the Privy Council and, as observed by Wilson, J. there is a very broad distinction between misconduct on the part of a widow as a widow, and her ceasing to be a widow. In this state of the authorities I think the decision in Murugayi v. Viramaka (1877) I.L.R. 1 M. 226 ought not to be overruled by this Court.

2. Considering the question apart from authority, I am of the same opinion. In his Principles of the Hindu Law, page 178 (1st edition) Mr. Ghose cites a text of Manu IX 191, " But if two (sons) begotten by two (different men) contend for the property (in the hands) of their mother, each shall take to the exclusion of the other, what belonged to his father. And he also cites another text to the sam