The court established the principle that the procedure adopted for suspension must comply with the necessary authority, and wrongful removal from a public office entitles the individual to damages.

1.This is an appeal from a decree of the Subordinate Judge of Kumbakonum dismissing the suit, brought by the plaintiff for a declaration that his suspension from the office of temple trustee by the Kumbakonum Devasthanam Committee was illegal, and for damages. The decision as to the legality of the suspension depends mainly in this case on the question whether the procedure adopted by the Committee can be supported What happened was that, after the plaintiff had been given notice of some or all of the charges against him, the 2nd defendant a member of the Committee drew up a report Ex. B 1, and forwarded copies of it to the other members of the Temple Committee proposing that the plaintiff and some other trustees should be suspended until further orders. In it he stated that, though the subject had been or a long time before the meeting, it had not been concluded. " It is therefore sent in circulation. I request that instead of writing meeting in this you will write your opinion." Defendants 1, 4 and 6 are proved to have assented to the course. The 5th defendant died after suit and defendants 7, 8 and 9 were not in office at the date of suspension. The 3rd defendant on receipt of Ex, B 1, sent an answer Ex. C: in which he stated, "It is not legal to take this step by circulation, much less by taking individual opinions as you are now doing, The procedure adopted is wrong from beginning to end. I request. you therefore to call a meeting for the purpose. " Ignoring this request the 2nd defendant wrote to the plaintiff the letter Exhibit A 1, in which he stated that the plaintiff had been suspended for the reasons set forth in the accompanying proceedings order and asked him to hand over to another of the trustees. The proceedings Ex. A 1, recorded the opinion of the majority that the plaintiff should be suspended, and disclosed the fact that the matter had been dealt with in circulation. Now the Temple Committee is a statutory body to which the powers formerly exercised by the Board of Revenue under Eegulation VII of 1817 have been transferred as regards certain temples by the Religious Endowments Act; and, these powers it may now be taken as settled include a power of suspending or dismissing the Temple Trustees for sufficient cause. It has however been held that in exercising these powers they are to a large extent in the position of a corporation and that their actions must be tried by the same tests. Now it is well settled that the ordinary way for bodies in the position of a corporation to transact the business is at a meeting, and, assuming that it is open to them to transact some of their business in circulation, I think they have no such power as regards matters such as suspension, or dismissal of free-hold officers under their superintendence as to which their authority must be strictly pursued. Rex v. Taylor (1694) 3 Salk 231 : 91 E. R.795. Rex v. Sutton (1711) 10.Mod. 74 : 88 E.R. 632. Thandavaraya Pittai v. Subbayyar (1899) I.L.R. 23 M. 483. 485. Ponnambala Pillai v. Muthu Chettiar (1916) 30 M.L.J. 619. Even if the matter could properly have been dealt with in circulation, that could only have been by consent of all the members and anyone of them would have had the right to insist on the matter being dealt with at a meeting, as the 3rd defendant endeavoured to do in this case. See the observations of Page Wood, V. C., in Hallows v. Ferine (1867) L.R. 3 Eq, 520, 537 which were approved by Sterling, J., In re Great Northern Salt and Chemical Works : Ex parte Kennedy (1889) 45 Ch. D. 472. Here there was not even what is Ordinarily known as circulation, as the 2nd defendant merely sent copies of his proposals to each of the other members and obtained their individual assents to his proposals. In these circumstances we are clearly of opinion that the action of the Committee in suspending the plaintiff was ultra vires.

2. It is then said that we ought to enquire whether there were valid grounds for suspending the pl