The cause of action for the recovery of penal assessment under Section 5 of Act III of 1905 arises on the date of the levy of the assessment or penalty, as provided in Section 14 of the Act.

1. Of the authorities quoted the observation relied on in Devaguptapu Bhaskarudu v. Pamarthy Subarayudu 21 Ind. Cas. 840 : 38 M. 674 : 14 M.L.T. 572 : (1914) M.W.N. 53 : 26 M.L.J. 60 was made merely tentatively, Sankaran Nair, J. expressing no final opinion. The reference in Secretary of State for India v. Itlakkal Assutt 32 Ind. Cas. 755 : 19 M.L.J. 157 : (1916) 1 M.W.N. 167 is merely to what passed during the argument between the learned Judges and Counsel; and it is, therefore, inconclusive Mamshah Thaika v. Secretary of State for India 49 Ind. Cas. 404 : 25 M.L.T. 227 : 9 L.W. 265 : 37 M.L.J. 213 : (1919) M.W.N. 688 and Tirumala Rao v. Kadekar Durgi Shettethi 22 Ind. Cas. 883 : (1914) M.W.N. 197 : 1 L.W. 134 deal with suits in which a declaration and injunction were in question. On the limitation applicable to such suits we express no opinion, because no question as to it ar ses in the present case. Here the only rel ef asked for is the recovery of the penal assessment imposed by Government under Section 5 of Act III of 1905 in one Fasli and it is urged that the lower Appellate Court should have held that the suit was barred because the plaintiff acquiesced in the levy of similar assessment in a previous Fasli. Section 14 of Act III of 1905 is, in our opinion, against any such contention. For the explanation provides that the cause of action in such a suit shall be treated as having arisen in respect of any assessment or penalty on the date on which such assessment or penalty is levied; and we cannot agree that the closing words of that explanation are equivalent to "on the date on which any similar assessment or penalty was levied in a previous year" without an undue effort of construction. We, there fore, agree with the lower Appellate Court, that the suit is in time. The appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.