IN THE HIGH COURT OF MARAS
Devadoss
Pattannayya
Versus
Pattayya Alias Krishnayya
Decided On : 9 October, 1925
Limitation - Execution of Decree - Order 21, Rule 57 - Article 181 of the Limitation Act - Joint Decree - Explanation 2 to Article 182 of the Limitation Act
Fact of the Case:
The appeal concerns the limitation of the decree-holder's application for execution. The decree was obtained in 1903, and subsequent execution applications were made. The issue arose whether the present application, filed nearly six years after the initial application, was barred by limitation.
Finding of the Court:
The Court held that the executing Court cannot dismiss an application for being long pending and must follow the procedure laid down in the Code. The application of 1915 was considered pending, and therefore not barred by limitation. The Court also determined that the decree was a joint decree, and the application against the 10th defendant was not barred by limitation due to previous applications against the 9th defendant.
Issues: The main issue was whether the decree-holder's application for execution was barred by limitation. Additionally, the nature of the decree as joint or several was also in question.
Ratio Decidendi: The executing Court cannot dismiss an application for being long pending and must follow the procedure laid down in the Code. The application of 1915 was considered pending, and therefore not barred by limitation. The decree was deemed a joint decree, and the application against the 10th defendant was not barred by limitation due to previous applications against the 9th defendant.
Final Decision: The Letters Patent Appeal was dismissed with costs.
Devadoss, J.
1. The only question in this appeal is whether the decree-holders application for execution is barred by limitation. The facts are briefly these: The respondents herein obtained a decree in O.S. No. 77 of 1903 on 28th September, 1903. It is admitted that the application for execution in R.E.P. No. 323 of 1915 on 11th March, 1915, was within time. The Court ordered delivery of the properties to the decree-holders on 21st July, 1915. Third persons objected to the delivery. The objection was removed and item 3 was delivered to them on 27th March, 1916, and the Court passed an order on that day: "The 3rd item was delivered to the petitioners and the petition was recorded." A suit was filed by the obstructors and a temporary injunction was granted against the delivery of item 2. The suit was ultimately dismissed on 18th December, 1916 and consequently the temporary injunction ceased to be in force from that date. The respondents filed an execution application on 3rd September, 1921, and prayed for delivery of item 2 from the 10th defendant. Both the Lower Courts dismissed the application as being barred by time and Jackson, J. held in C.M.S.A. No. 38 of 1923 that the application was within time. Hence this appeal by the 10th defendant.
2. The first contention is that the present application filed nearly six years after the application of 1915 is barred by limiitation and it is urged that if this application is to be treated as an application to revive the execution application of 1915, it should have been filed within three years of 18th December, 1916 when the obstruction to execution was removed. The order of the District Munsif on the application of 1915 is " the third item was delivered to the petitioners and--the petition was recorded." The question is whether this order amounts to a dismissal of the application. The present Code of Civil Procedure does not contemplate the passing of such an order. When an execution application is filed, if it is in order, it has to bo disposed of on the merits; if it is barred by limitation or if the decree has been satisfied, or if the applicant is not the decree-holders assignee or his legal representative, or if the decree-holder does not help the Court in executing the decree, or omits to do anything which the Court directs him to do, the application will have to be dismissed unless for proper reasons the Court adjourns the application. If the decree-holder is not able to do a thing directed to be done within the time allowed by the Court, the Court has to give him further time. There is no provision of law by which the executing Court could lodge the petition or record it, or strike it off for what is commonly called the statistical purposes. The executing Court is bound to follow the procedure laid down in the Code and it cannot dismiss the application for the reason that it is long pending. If there is obstruction to the execution of the decree, the Court ought to adjourn the petition till the removal of the obstruction. It does not matter how long the obstruction continues. If a temporary injunction is issued against a Court executing a decree, the Court should stay its hands till the injunction is dissolved or till the suit in which it is granted is disposed of. If a permanent injunction is granted against the execution of the decree, then the application for execution will have to be dismissed. If the executing Court adjourns the petition from time to time it will enable the decree-holder to inform the Court as to the progress of the suit or proceeding in which the temporary injunction is granted and as soon as it is informed that the obstruction has been removed the Court should proceed to dispose of the application according to law. It is to prevent dilatory proceedings and the long pendency of execution applications that Order 21, Rule 57 has been enacted. It lays upon the decree-holder the duty of helping the Court to execute the decree in his favour and if by
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