Walter Salis Schwabe, K.C., C.J.

1. The question to be decided in this case is whether on a proper interpretation of the notification contained in the Fort St. George Gazette of May 5th, 1922 the rules imposing increased institution fees on suits on the Original Side of this Court apply the new scale to suits instituted on that day or not. The words of the notification are "that the amendments do come into force from the date of publication in the Fort St George Gazette," and the whole question is whether those words mean on and after that date, including May the 5th, or after that date excluding May the 5th.

2. The matter has been most fairly and clearly argued by the Advocate General for the Crown and Mr. V.V. Srinivasa Iyengar for the litigants, and I have also had the opportunity of studying and considering the judgments of my brothers, who take different views on this matter. I approach-this matter conscious of the salutary rule that, in all statutes imposing taxation, any real ambiguity must be decided in favour of the subject and against the Crown. I consider that the hour of the day at which the Gazette was actually published is a wholly irrelevant consideration, because on neither view does it make any difference. If the Gazette had been published early in the morning, according to the view of Kumaraswami Sastri, J., the tax will come into operation only the next day. If it had been published late in the night, according to the view of Coutts-Trotter, J., the tax would still be operative from the time the office opened for the receipt of plaints on that day. I agree that we have nothing to do with the English Common Law except in so far as it may afford some guide as to the proper meaning to be attached to words in the English language. I think this may be deduced from a study of all the English authorities, namely, that in every case the word "from" preceding a date may have one of two meanings, namely, on and after, that is, including the named date, or merely after, that is excluding the named date, and that it is necessary to look at the context and the circumstances of each case to arrive at the true construction. But I think further that, unless there are valid reasons to the contrary, certain rules may be deduced and they may he stated thus: (i) that, if the named date is the beginning of a defined limited period, that is, where there is a terminus ad quern as well as a terminus a quo, then prima facie the first day is excluded; (2) that, if the named date is the beginning of an indefinite period then prima facie the first day is included. I say prima facie because in my view there must be exceptions, for example, if I announced that I should sit on the Original Side from Monday next, I should interpret that to mean including Monday, and that whether I had announced that I should do so for a month only or whether I had left the terminus ad quern indefinite. In my view these rules have been recognised by the framers of the two Indian Statutes, the Indian General Clauses Act X of 1897, Section 3, Sub-section (12), and the Madras General Clauses Act I of 1891, Section 9 following the English Interpretation Act of 1889, 52 and 53 Vic. cap. 63. I do not think it necessary to decide whether any of these Interpretation Acts applies, though I incline to the view that the-English Act applies, as none of them deal specifically with this point.

3. Applying the general rules stated above to this case, the named date must be included unless there is some valid reason why it should not be, and I can find none. It is true that it may have the effect of making persons pay more than they understood they had to pay when they filed their suits; but this seems to me a ground for criticising the method of imposing this tax rather than a ground for interpreting the notice in any particular way; and I think that this argument is more than counterbalanced by the fact that this was a sudden imposition of a tax which in many cases