The main legal point established in the judgment is the need for clear evidence of the accused's participation in specific acts and the common intention of the mob to establish their legal responsibility in a riot.

Wallace, J.

1. Petitioners have been convicted of having taken part in a riot and committed various offences in the course of the riot. The riot took place at Karur on the night of 24th August 1921 and early morning of 25th August 1921, and was occasioned, as found by the lower Courts, by an attempt on the part of the Congress arid Khilafat Committees there to compel the manager of a theatrical troupe performing at the theatre at Karur to hand over to the funds of these Committees his takings for one nights performance. Annoyed at in refusal, the crowd who had accompanied the Secretaries of these Committees attacked the theatre while the performance was going on, stampeded the audience and committed various acts of violence to the persons in the audience and the property of the troupe. The Trying Court has written a careful and discriminating judgment, in which the main facts of the riot are very clearly set out.

2. The chief incidents of the night are detailed in order in paragraph 83 and following paragraphs of the Trying Courts judgment. The particular offences of which the crowd, generally, has been found guilty are endangering human life by throwing stones (Section 336, Indian Penal Code), causing hurt by the same (Section 337), causing hurt to Police Officers (Section 332), wrongful restraint (Section 341), mischief (Section 426) and criminal trespass (Section 447). The lower Courts have found the petitioners guilty of all these offences either directly or constructively by force of Sections 34 and 149, Indian Penal Code.

3. The riot began at 8-30 P.M. and went on spasmodically till 9-30 the next morning. Between 11-30 P.M., when the Police fired and one of the mob was killed, until 6-30 A.M., there appears to have been a decided lull in the activities of the mob. Prior to 11-30 P. M., however, all the offences of which the mob as a whole were found guilty of had been perpetrated, although again at 6-30 A. M. there was a renewal of the offences under Sections 426 and 447, and further offences under Section 435 by isolated members of the crowd. That the actions of the mob between 8-30 and 11-30 P.M. were united and concerted and continuous admits of no doubt; and for whatever criminal offences it committed or was likely to commit in furtherance of its common object during that period, each member of the assembly would in law be responsible. As to the renewal of activities at 6-30 A.M. before individual members of the original mob could be held in law responsible for those acts, it would have to be clearly shown either that they were present during the second riot or that the second riot was a continuation of, and a likely result of the first.

4. It is also found that one of the petitioners, the 1st accused although present at the beginning of the riot at 8-30 P.M. left the place almost at once.

5. It is contended generally for petitioners, and cannot, I think, be denied, that both the lower Courts have used Sections 34 and 149 of the Indian Penal Code in too loose and uncritical a manner, and have not clearly in all cases found as fact the ingredients necessary for convictions by force of these sections. In cases where there is no direct evidence of the actual participation of the accused in a specific act of violence, if persons proved at particular points of time to be members of the mob but not shown to have taken part in the specific act are to be found guilty of that act by force of Section 34, it must be clearly found that that act was in furtherance of the common intention of the mob while these accused were in it, or if Section 149 is used, it must be clearly found that that act was also in prosecution of the common object or such as these accused knew to be likely to be committed in prosecution of their object. The common object of the rioters for the purpose of Section 149, which may be taken to be much the same as the common intention for the purpose of Section 34, is set out in the charge, as taking vengeance