The main legal point established in the judgment is that the equitable principle applies in cases of alienation of joint family property by one co-parcener, and the purchaser's rights in a general partition can prevail, subject to the absence of substantial injustice to the non-alienating co-parceners.

Walter Salis Schwabe, K.C., C.J.

1. By a deed of absolute sale one Rarnachandra Ayyar sold certain lands to the 3rd defendant purporting to act for himself and as the guardian, protector and father of his minor son, the 2nd defendant. The rights of the 3rd defendant are now vested in the plaintiff. The 1st and 2nd defendants are members of a joint Hindu family and the lands in question were their joint property. At the time of the sale the 3rd defendant obtained from the 1st defendant a security bond by which the 1st defendant gave him an indemnity against the loss that might arise by any claim of the minor 2nd defendant. That bond took the form of a charge to the extent of Rs. 8,000 on certain other lands which it appears also formed part of the joint family property. This suit is brought for a general partition of the joint family property and it is prayed that, in that partition, the suit lands shall be allotted to the 1st defendant, so that, whether he was entitled to alienate them or not, the plaintiff may get them as standing in the shoes of the 1st defendant.

2. The District Munsif of Ncgapatam, Mr. R. V. Krishna Ayyar held that the sale was not binding on the 2nd defendant. He decreed a general partition and directed that all the joint properties should be divided into two equal shares between the 1st and 2nd defendants and that, in effecting such partition, the lands sold to the 3rd defendant should be allotted to the 1st defendant, and adjourned the suit to appoint a commissioner to effect the partition. Without the appointment of a Commissioner the 1st and 2nd defendants divided the property filing lists of properties which they had agreed to take in those lists allotting to the 1st defendant the properties sold to the 3rd defendant. It was not contended that this division of property would work any injustice to the and defendant and, indeed, by the agreement between the 1st and 2nd defendants as to the division, it is clear that it was admitted that this was not the case. The District Munsif in his Judgment has stated quite clearly the principle to be applied. On the case coming before the Subordinate Judge, Tanjore, he reversed the decree stating that the 2nd defendant had a prhna facie right to a half share in the specific properties alienated and that there was no reason for depriving him of that natural right in giving effect to the equity in favour of the third defendant and he saw no paramount equity to be enforced in favour of the 3rd defendant or his vendee so as to over-ride the natural rights of the plaintiff operating to his prejudice.

3. The principle of equity to be applied in such cases is well established and will be found clearly stated in the judgment of Bashyam Aiyangar, J. in his very learned judgment in Ayyagiri Venkataramayya v. Ayyagiri Ramayya (1902) I.L.R. 25 M. 690 at 715 and 716 and in Manjayya Mudali v. Shamnuga Mudali .(1913) I.L.R. 38 M, 684;26.M.L.J. 576, and it is that a purchaser from one member of a joint family which that member has no right to sell, it being the joint property, can enforce the sale only by a partition of the entire family property; and if, in such partition, the property sold, can, with due regard to the interests of the other sharers, to the debts due by the family and to an equitable allocation of the various items of family property to the shares of the several co-parceners, be wholly allotted to the vendors share, the purchaser will be entitled to the whole property which the vendor professed to convey to him. In my judgment, the learned District Munsif puts this case from the right point of view and I should content myself with saying that I have nothing to add to his excellent judgment, which is a clear and well-reasoned judgment, and that I do not agree with the judgment of the Subordinate Judge, because I do not appreciate what natural rights of the plaintiff operating to his prejudice are over-ridden by the District Munsifs decree. But Mr. Venkatrama