The central legal point established in the judgment is the binding nature of alienations by co-widows, the rights of survivorship, and the limitations on alienation under Hindu Law and the Contract Act.

1. This Second Appeal arises out of a suit by one of two Hindu widows for partition of her husbands property and possession of a share. The 1st defendant is the co-widow and she sold a part of the property under Ex. IV to the 2nd defendant who married the daughter of a deceased co-wife of plaintiff and 1st defendant, and another part to the 3rd defendant under Ex. VI. The 4th defendant is the undivided brother of the 3rd defendant. The 1st and 2nd defendants lived in the same house. The District Munsif decreed the suit. On appeal, the Subordinate Judge remanded the suit for fresh trial. On remand, the District Munsif again passed a decree in favour of the plaintiff. In the interval the 1st defendant died. There was again an appeal to the Subordinate Judge. The plaintiff prayed for an amendment of the plaint and prayed for possession of the entire estate as the result of the 1st defendants death. The amendment was allowed. The Subordinate Judge granted a decree to the plaintiff for possession of the entire property. The defendants 2 to 4 appeal.

2. The portion of the case relating to the alienations in favour of defendants 3 and 4 has not been seriously pressed and the other portion relating to the 2nd defendant has been fully argued.

3. The Subordinate Judge found that out of the Rs. 600 for which Ex. IV was executed, Rs. 516 was utilised to discharge a decree obtained by D. W. 6 against the husband (Ex. V). If the sale was effected by both the widows, it would have been for purposes beneficial to the estate and therefore binding on the daughter and other reversioners. The appellants vakil contended, relying on Kalliyanasundaram Pillai v. Subba Moopanar (1903) 14 MLJ 139. that the sale ought to be upheld against the plaintiff. In Sri Gajapathi Radhamani v. Maharani Sri Pusapati Alakajeswari (1892) ILR 16 M 1 (PC) and Vadali Mamidigadu v. Kotipalli Ramayya (1902) ILR 26 M 334 it was held that one of two co-widows cannot alienate the share of the other even for purposes beneficial to the estate without the consent of the other. The decision in Kattiyanasundaram Pillai v. Subba Moopanar (1903) 14 MLJ 139. decided by Benson and Bashyam Aiyangar, JJ. the same Judges who decided Vadali Mamidigadu v. Kotipalli Ramayya (1902) ILR 26 M 334. is apparently inconsistent with this, but, on a careful examination of the judgment, it seems to me that the Judges were of opinion on its facts, that the senior widow was recognised as manager or agent of the other. Such an inference can be made only in a case where there is no known hostility between the widows and is not possible when the widows are hostile to each other as in this case. We therefore agree with the Courts below in holding that Ex. IV is not binding on the plaintiffs half share.

4. The next point that has been argued in the case is that Ex. IV is at least binding on the 1st defendants half share. The appellants rely on the unreported judgment of this Court in A.S. No. 166 of 1922. The position of two co-widows or two daughters has been the subject of consideration in several decisions of the various High Courts and the Privy Council. In Rindamma v. Venkataramappa (1866) 3 MHCR 268. Bittleston, C.J and Ellis, J. observed: "Upon the death of the husband the widows became jointly entitled; they might agree to divide the estate and hold separately distinct shares of it during their joint lives. We are not prepared to say they might not enter into such an agreement as would bind each to an absolute surrender of all interest in the others share, so as to let in the next heirs of the husband immediately upon the death of that other.... One obtained a decree against the other for a division.... It dealt only with the joint estate, and the joint estate ceased on the death of Krishnamma. Then the whole estate of the husband vested in the surviving widow ; and neither Krishnam-mas claim for division nor the decree for division could touch that." In another case Jijoyiamba Bayi Saiba v.