Adverse possession prior to a grant from the Government should not be counted against the grantee, impacting the limitation period for a suit.

1. In this case the plaintiff is the appellant before me. The suit was filed to recover certain lands which were originally service inam lands attached to office of karnam and were enfranchised by Government. The Subordinate Judge found that Item No. 1 had been held adversely by the defendants from before 1889. and as to Items Nos. 2 and 3 that the defendants were holding them adversely for at least 20 years before suit. On these findings he held that the suit is barred by limitation. The plaintiff files the second appeal.

2. The enfranchisement was effected by Government in 1906, the title-deed, Ex. B, being dated December 2, 1906, and the present suit was filed on June 26, 1918. If the plaintiff gets a fresh cause of action from the date of the enfranchisement by Government, there is no doubt that the plaintiffs suit is not barred. The Privy Council have now held that enfranchisement constitutes a fresh grant. If the plaintiff obtained the title in 1906, free of the prior adverse possession then his suit is not barred. The point in appeal thus reduces itself to the question whether when the Grown makes a grant at a time when the defendant was already in adverse possession for less than 60 years, what adverse possession counts in a suit by the grantee. If the prior adverse possession would not be counted against the grantee, the period would be 12 years from the date of the grant. This is the view now pressed before me by the appellant. The other view is that preceding adverse possession should count against the plaintiff and if the period of prior adverse possession exceeded 12 years, the suit is barred; in other words, the moment the grant is made by the Grown the title is extinguished subject to the possibility pf obtaining peaceful possession: vide below.

3. It is claimed by the respondent that the latter view is supported by Jagadindra Nath Roy v. Hementa Kumari Debi [1905] 32 Cal. 129. The point was not directly discussed in it, but it was held that the period of 60 years under Article 149 does not avail the grantee from the Grown and, therefore, the period of limitation was only 12 years. It was held that the suit was not barred as the plaintiff was a minor and the adverse possession began in his time. I think the case is not conclusive on the point. Another case relied on by the respondents is Gunga Gobind Mundul v. Collector of the 24-Pergunahs [1866] 11 M.I.A. 345. This case also does not seem to me to be conclusive. The respondent next relies on a case, in Municipal Commissioners for the City of Madras v. Sarangapani Mudaliar [1896] 19 Mad. 154 All that was held there was that the period of sixty years cannot be taken advantage of by a Municipality. But assuming it is 12 years, from what time that should be computed was not discussed in it. The same remarks apply to Pullanppally Sankaran Nambudri v. Vittil Thalokat Mahomed [1905] 28 Mad. 505. The actual decision went off on a ground other than limitation. Though these cases are not clear in favour of the respondent the case in Annada Mohon, Roy v. Kina Das A.I.R. 1924 Cal.

394. supports his contention and I do not see why, on principle, the defendants adverse possession prior to the grant from the Grown is terminated by the grant and cannot be tacked on to later adverse possession after the grant. If such prior adverse possession was for a period of more than 12 years, there is no need to tack it on to the later adverse possession and we would think the assignees title is extinguished if he cannot get peaceable possession and has to sue to recover possession.

4. This view is supported by Deo v. Morris [1835] 2 Bing. (N.C.) 189. The respondent also refers to a case in Emmerson v. Maddison [1906] A.C. 569 It seems to me that this case lays down the correct principle in such matters In such a case, if the Grown takes peaceable possession from the trespasser and then hands it over to the grantee and the grantee enters into possession the case does not present any diff