The powers of the Court, including the appointment of a Receiver, must be in accordance with the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code and cannot be extended through inherent powers.

1. This is a petition asking this Court to appoint a Receiver pending disposal of Cr. R. C. No. 239 of 1925, which is a petition asking this Court to revise an order of the Lower Court passed under Section 145, Criminal Procedure Code.

2. Mr. Jayarama Aiyar for respondents raises a preliminary objection that this Court has no jurisdiction to entertain such a petition. We think the preliminary objection is well founded. If this Court has jurisdiction, it must be found within the Criminal Procedure Code [see the remarks of the learned Chief Justice in Sankaralinga Mudaliar v. Narayana Mudaliar (1922) ILR 45 M 913 : 43 MLJ 369 (FB).]. Section 561-A confers no new powers on this Court, since "the Court cannot, by invoking its inherent powers, extend the powers given to it by Statute" [Full Bench ruling in Veerappa Naidu v. Avudayammal (1924) 48 MLJ 106 (F.B.). ]. Petitioner relies on Section 423(1)(d) read with Section 439, but an interlocutory order of the kind now sought by petitioner to be passed before the criminal revision case is heard is obviously not an order either incidental to or consequential on an order which has not yet been passed in the criminal revision case and which may eventually not be in petitioners favour at all. It cannot be an order which necessarily follows from the order eventually passed in revision. The cases quoted by petitioner, Reid v. Richardson (1887) ILR 14 C 361 and The Katras Jherriah Coal Co. v. Sibkrishta Daw and Co. (1894) ILR 22 C 297. have no bearing on this point.

3. It is next urged that the High Court must be deemed to possess all the powers which the Magistrate has in an enquiry under Chapter XII, Criminal Procedure Code. Such a general claim was considered in another connection by a Full Bench of this Court in Veerappa Naidu v. Avudayammal (1924) 48 MLJ 106 (FB) and negatived. Even assuming for the sake of argument that the High Court has that power, it would not in the least avail petitioner. For, in the first place, the Magistrate and therefore, ex hypothesi, the High Court, can only appoint a Receiver while the enquiry is pending, and the enquiry is now over, and in the second place, the Magistrate, and therefore again the High Court, can appoint a Receiver only where it is satisfied that a dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace exists, whereas now the Magistrates order has put respondent in possession of the property, and there is no danger of a breach of the peace, unless petitioner intends to defy the order of the Magistrate, and the High Court would certainly not encourage a party who announces his intention of doing so.

4. It is urged finally that, unless petitioners prayer is granted, he will suffer much loss if he eventually succeeds in the criminal revision case. Obviously such a consideration does not confer on the High Court powers which it does not possess. In any case Criminal Courts are not primarily for the purpose of preventing private parties from sustaining pecuniary loss. Petitioner has his remedy in a civil claim for damages. We dismiss the petition.