Phillips, J.

1. The only question that arises here is whether Order 9 applies only to suits or whether, by reason of Section 141, it also applies to applications made under Order 9 itself. In this case an application to restore a suit was dismissed for default and a subsequent petition was filed to set aside that dismissal. The subsequent petition has been allowed and the original petition under Order 9 is now under enquiry.

2. The contention for the appellant is that the Court had no jurisdiction to treat the second application as one to which Order 9 is applicable. In Thakur Prasad v. Fakir Ullah (1894) I.L.R. 17 All 106 : 5 M.L.J. 3 (P C) it was laid down by the Privy Council that Section 647 of the Code of 1882, which is equivalent to Section 141 of the present Code, included original matters in the nature of suits, such as proceedings in Probate, Guardianship, and so forth, and did not include executions. The question at issue in that suit was whether execution petitions were included in that section and it was definitely laid down that they were not so included. What was held to be included were original matters in the nature of suits, but this statement is not exhausti