The main legal point established in the judgment is the procedure for the appointment and renewal of a trustee in a scheme suit, including the necessity of nomination by the villagers and approval by the Court before appointing or renewing a trustee. The judgment also clarified the requirement for a separate suit for the removal of a trustee and emphasized the non-appealability of the District Judge's order under Section 47, Civil Procedure Code.

Spencer, J.

1. The revised decree in this scheme suit as passed on March 16th, 1906, by the learned District Judge of Tinnevelly (now Mr. Justice Phillips) provided that the trustee should hold office for a term of 7 years renewable at the will of the villagers and the Court, New trustees ware to hold office upon nomination by the villagers of Thiruvannathapuram and Thimmarajapuram, subject to the approval of the District Court. More than twice 7 years bad passed, when the matter came up again before the District Judge of Tinnevelly in November 1924. At that time, there was a mahazar dated 16bh December, 1922, signed by several villagers asking the Court to approve of the nomination of Venkatarama Aiyar. There was another mahazar dated 15th February, 1923, asking the Court to appoint. Venkateswara Aiyar, the trustee hitherto in office. While that was pending, the present petitioner and appellant, Sivan Pillai who claimed to have an interest in the trust, filed a petition supporting the candidature of Venkateswara Aiyar, The District Judge dismissed the petition and from his order this is an appeal or a revision. So far as the records show, the District) Judge was in error in stating that the 4th respondent was to be treated as holding office for the third term. He seems to have failed to appreciate that under the scheme, it was necessary to have a nomination by the villagers and an approval by the Court before any trustee could be appointed or his term renewed. The District Judge might have called upon the villagers to make a nomination of the person considered by the villagers to be the most fit to be appointed as a trustee upon the expiry of the term of Venkateswara Aiyar, and if the nomination so made by them had his approval, he might have appointed the nominee. It does not appear whether there was any such nomination and confirmation. But the District Judge made an order disposing of the petitions of Venkatarama Aiyar and of Sivan Pillai. The petition of the former was that the present trustee should be removed. That request could not be granted by the District Judge upon a petition of this nature. For the removal of a trustee, it would be necessary to bring a separate suit, in the absence of any provision in the scheme for his removal. Upon Sivan Pillais [i.e., petitioners] petition, it is not clear what order the District Judge could have made other than to dismiss it, as it was not competent. The scheme does not provide for independent petitions being put in to support the candidature of various claimants for the office of trustee, As the District Judge has not acted without jurisdiction or committed any material irregularity in his order dismissing the petition, we cannot interfere in revision.

2. As regards the appeal, there is a preliminary objection that no appeal will lie. In the light of the recent Privy Council decision in Bhogilal v. The Dakore Temple Committee A.I.R. 1925 P.C. 155 (P.C.), and the decisions of this Court in Lokasikhamani Mudaliar v. Thiagaroya Chettiar (1917) 5 L.W. 596 and Ranganadha v. Krishnaswamy A.I.R. 1924 Mad. 369, I am of opinion that an appeal will not lie against the order made by a Court, as in this case exercising a power given to it by a provision in the schsme and that such an order is not an order made in execution. In Prayaga Doss Jee Varu v. Tirumala Purisa Srirangacharyulu (1908) 31 Had. 406, there is an observation that the order to be made by a District Court, in that case appointing a treasurer in a scheme of management of a Devasthanam, should be considered as an order made in execution. But, in view of the decision of the Privy Council to which I have referred, I do not think we are bound by that observation which was made with reference to the circumstances of the particular scheme concerned in that case. The appeal and the revision petition are dismissed. As the District Judges order was some what ambiguous, there will be no order as to costs.

Madhavau Nair, J.

3. I