The main legal point established in the judgment is the limited authority of an interim Receiver and the requirements for setting aside a sale in execution of a decree in the context of insolvency proceedings.

1. We are asked to revise the order of the District Judge of West Tanjore (Mr. Viswanatha Sastri) setting aside a sale held in execution of a decree which had been confirmed by the Subordinate Judge of Kumbakonam. The sale was held on 30th September, 1920. Seven days previously, on 23rd September, the 1st judgment-debtor who is the father of the other judgment-debtors presented an insolvency petition. An interim Receiver was appointed and he wrote and asked the Subordinate Judge to stop the sale. It was nevertheless held and confirmed by the Subordinate Judge on 27th November. An adjudication order in insolvency was made on 15th December. A year later the adjudication was annulled by the District Judge and the annulment was set aside by this Court on 23rd January, 1923.

2. At the outset it will be well to clear the ground of two errors. The learned District Judge states in his order that the adjudication took place on 28th September, 1920. The order which is before us is under the hand and seal of the Official Receiver of the Tanjore District and is dated 15th December, 1920. Next the affidavits filed in support of the petition under Order 21, Rule 90, to set aside the sale declare that the properties of the insolvent had become vested in the Official Receiver. Under Section 28 of Act V of 1920 vesting only takes place upon adjudication, and under Section 29 it is not till then that a Court in which proceedings are pending against a debtor, is bound to stay them.

3. An interim Receiver has under Section 20 only the powers of a Receiver appointed under the Code of Civil Procedure and he is not clothed even with those powers till he takes possession of the debtors properties. This is clear from the section itself. A Receiver appointed under the Code must obtain possession before the leave of the Court is required for disturbing his possession. Until he is actually in possession a creditor is not debarred from proceeding to execution vide Livinia Ashton v. Madhabmoni Dasi (1910) 11 CLJ 489, Kanailal v. Manoo Bibi (1910) 11 CLJ 489 and Rajah Jagadish Chandra Deo Dhabal Deb v. Bhubaneswar Mitra (1922) 27 CWN 38.

4. The Receiver referred to in Sections 51 and 52 is a Receiver appointed upon adjudication and the learned District Judge was of opinion that the Subordinate Judge ought to have stopped the sale as soon as he was informed about the appointment of the Official Receiver as interim Receiver. Although the writer of the letter of September, 28th happened to be the Official Receiver of the Tanjore District, he was acting in the capacity of an interim Receiver, and therefore, as he was not in possession of the debtors properties, the Subordinate Judge was not bound to stop the sale or to direct the property to be delivered to him under Section 52 vide Ralla Ram v. Ram Labhaya (1924) 6 Lah LJ 832. After the sale had been completed there was no reason for setting it aside besides the suggestion that the price fetched was low. The encumbrances on the properties were all set out in the remarks column of the sale Proclamation. Instead of requiring evidence as to the value of the items sold, the learned Judge was guided by hearsay information as to the prices of land prevailing in and near the town of Kumbakonam. It was not shown that any material irregularities were committed in the publication or conduct of the sale or that any one sustained substantial injury thereby. As regards the sale proceeds in Court the Subordinate Judge has told the Receiver that he may make any application that he may be entitled to make in respect of them. As the sale took place after the petition to be declared insolvent was presented, applications for distribution of the assets will be dealt with under Section 51

5. As regards the sons shares the learned District Judge observed that the Official Receiver can exercise the right of the insolvents father to sell his sons shares in immoveable property to pay antecedent debts. This view as to the powers of