Devadoss, J.

1. A scheme suit was framed for a mosque at Bezwada in O.S. No. 113 of 1913. Five worshippers at the mosque applied to the Subordinate Court at Bezwada to have the scheme amended. The Subordinate Judge, after taking evidence, has amended the scheme to a considerable extent. This appeal is by the members of the panchayat who were appointed to hold office for life. The question raised in the appeal is whether the following clause in the scheme is ultra vires or intra vires.

The provisions of this scheme may be altered or modified as if it were in execution of the decree in this suit on the application of not less than three worshippers resident in Bezwada to the Sub-Court exercising original jurisdiction over the town of Bezwada or in the absence of such Court, the District Court of Kistna.

2. The contention of Mr. Ramadoss for the appellant is that this provision is ultra vires. Before considering the question whether such a clause is ultra vires or not, we have to see what the clause means. Under the clause an application can be made as if in execution of the decree. It has been held by the Privy Council in Sevak Jeranchod Bhogilal v. Dakore Temple Committee A.I.R. 1925 P.C. 155 that an order on an application of this kind is not an order on an execution application. In that case, under the decrees the District Court was empowered to frame rules for the working of a scheme. Certain Rule 3 were framed and an appeal was preferred to the High Court against the order of the District Judge. The Privy Council held that no appeal lay against the order of the District Judge. In Ranganath Thathachariyar v. Krishnaswamy Thathachariar A.I.R. 1924 Mad. 369, it was held that no appeal lay against the order of appointment of a trustee by the Subordinate Judge in exercise of the power given to him under the scheme. In that case some worshippers interested in the temple presented a petition to the Sub-Court for directions to fill up a vacancy caused by the resignation of a trustee. The Subordinate Judge directed the Board of Supervision to fill up the vacancy. The trustee who is said to have resigned appealed to the High Court. The High Court held that though the order of the Subordinate Judge was a judicial one, it was not passed in execution and therefore no appeal lay. The application of the respondents cannot be considered to be an application in execution. Parties cannot give power to a Court to treat the matter in a particular way. This contention necessarily involves an objection to the maintainability of this appeal. The order passed by the lower Court not being one in execution no appeal lies. It cannot be treated as a decree within the meaning of Section 47. Though in many eases appeals were allowed yet, after the ruling of the Privy Council in Sevak Jeranchod Bhoji Lal v. Dakore Temple Committee A.I.R. 1925 P.C. 155 Courts are incompetent to entertain appeals against orders passed by Subordinate Courts with regard to the alteration of a scheme once settled by the Court. I, therefore, treat this as a revision petition as I consider that the lower Court acted without jurisdiction in altering the scheme.

3. The contention of the respondent is that a scheme once framed is always liable to alteration and that the Courts in India have the same power as the Courts of Chancery in England and that Courts can always alter schemes for proper reasons. That the Court has power to alter a scheme cannot be denied. Any schemes framed for the management of a public, charitable, or religious institution or trust can always be altered for proper grounds. The question is whether it should be done as provided by Section 92, or by an application to the Court which framed the scheme. In several schemes provision is made for alteration by an application to the Court by the parties or by persons interested in their working. In the well-known Tirupathi case such a provision was made in the scheme : vide Prayag Doss Ji Vara v. Trimai Sreeran