Shephard, J.

1. The first point taken in the argument of this appeal is that raised by the 3rd issue. It appears from the evidence, and indeed is in a measure admitted in the plaint itself, that before this suit was launched several suits were brought by the plaintiff or his predecessor against the defendant or his predecessor, in some of which suits decrees were obtained by the Zamorin for the partition of the particular parcels comprised in such suits. In each of these suits the tenant, who, as the plaint states and is admitted, held half under the Zamorin and half under the Nair, was joined as a party. So far as regards the tenant, the plaint made such allegations and asked for such relief as would be made and asked for against any tenant holding under a jenmi, while as regards the Nair, the plaint asked for partition, so that in the result the tenant might be left in undisturbed possession of the moiety allotted to the Nair. Independently of these suits there was another suit brought against the Nair alone in which a division of the devasvom property was sought for. That suit was dismissed on the ground that such property was not partible.

2. In these circumstances we are asked to hold that Section 43 of the Civil Procedure Code applies and that the plaintiff, having in his former suits omitted to sue in respect of the property now in question, is precluded from maintaining the present suit for partition of that property. Stated in the abstract, the question may be said to be whether one of two tenants in common, having sued for partition of part of the property so held by them, is at liberty to bring a separate suit for the remainder of the property. Now, it is quite clear that, in applying Section 43 of the Code, it has first to be seen whether the cause of action alleged in the plaint is identical with the cause of action alleged in the former suit (Pittapur Raja v. Suriya Rau I.L.R. 8 M. 524; Mussummat Chand Koiur v. Partab Singh, L. R., 15 I. A., 157; Munshee Buzloor Ruheem v. Shumsoonnissa Begum, 11 M. I. A., 605) and that by the term cause of action must be understood all the circumstances alleged by the plaintiff to exist which, if proved or admitted, will entitle him to the relief prayed for (L. R., 15 I. A. 158; Bead v. Brown, 22 Q. B. D., p. 131). The class of cases to which Section 43 is intended to apply is indicated by the illustration. Where there has been an infringement of one right and one cause of action has arisen, the plaintiff must make his whole claim once for all in one suit. For instance, a plaintiff, who complains of wrongful detention or misappropriation of his securities, cannot, after recovering the securities or some of them in one action, afterwards sue to recover the remainder or damages for the detention of them (11 M. I. A., p. 605; Serrao v. Noel, 15 Q. B. D. 554). There being one single cause of action and the plaintiff having had "an opportunity in the former suit of recovering what he seeks to recover in the second, the former recovery is a bar to the latter action." The rule of law embodied in Section 43 operates not to give the defendant a ground of exception to the first suit, but, by prohibiting a second suit, indirectly to compel the plaintiff to include his whole demand in the first suit. There are, however, cases in which the nature of the right is such that independently of Section 43 the plaintiff is prohibited from severing his claim. For example, a mortgagor cannot redeem part of the mortgaged property on payment of a proportionate part of the mortgage debt. It is the right of the mortgagee to retain the whole security for any part of the debt. If the mortgagor chose to relinquish a part of the mortgaged property and sought to recover the remainder on payment of the whole debt, the mortgagee would have no reason to complain and he would, under Section 43, have a complete answer to a second suit brought to recover the omitted part (see Ukha v. Daga, I. L. E., 7 B., 182)