The judgment established the legal principle that a mortgagee's purchase of mortgaged property in an execution sale does not extinguish the mortgage debt and that the mortgagor retains the right to redeem the property.

1. The facts of this case are as follows;--The respondent before this Court, the Commercial and Land Mortgage Bank, Limited, India, in O.S. No. 27 of 1896 on the file of the District Court: of Trichinopoly, sued the now appellant before this Court on a mortgage of certain properties for over Rs. 1,20,000 of which he was the owner and obtained a decree under Section 88 of the Transfer of Property Act for sale of those properties. Subsequently a portion of those properties was sold in execution of a simple money decree for Rs. 1339 and interest thereon and costs obtained by one A. Srinivasa Aiyar against the appellant in Regular suit No. 239,of 1896 on the file of the District Munsif of Trichinopoly. and was purchased by the Bank. The property so sold was sold subject to the decree debt under the abovementioned decree held by the Bank. Thereupon the appellant presented a petition to the District Court of Trichinopoly purporting to be made under Section 258 of the Civil Procedure Code, claiming that, under the circumstances above stated, the Bank was bound to discharge their mortgage debt and praying that they might be called upon to certify satisfaction of the decree in O.S. No, 27 of 1896.

2. The District Judge was of opinion that the Banks mortgage debt was not extinguished by reason of their having purchased the property sold "in execution of the decree in Suit No. 239 of 1896, and that they could not be held liable for more than the actual value of that property, supposing it to be sold free of encumbrance, " even though the sale proclamation did not declare that that property was liable only for a portion of the mortgage-debt." He therefore dismissed the petition.

3. Against this order of the District Judge the petitioner appeals on the ground (1) that the respondents having purchased the property sold in execution of the decree in Suit No. 239 of 1896 subject to the whole mortgage, the lower Court ought to have directed them to certify satisfaction of their whole decree; and (2) that even on the view taken by the lower Court it ought to have directed the ascertainment of the real value of that property and directed the Bank to certify satisfaction of their decree to the extent of such value.

4. Before dealing with the merits of the case, we will dispose of a preliminary objection which was raised by the learned Vakil for the respondents to the entertainment by the lower Court of the petition of the appellant, on the ground that the alleged extinguishment of the respondents mortgage debt, by their purchase of the portion of the mortgaged property at the execution sale, assuming such purchase to have had that effect; was not an "adjustment" of the decree within the meaning of Section 258 of the Civil Procedure Code. We should hesitate before we hold that what occurred was such an "adjustment" of the decree, but we do not consider it necessary to decide this question, because we are of opinion that apart from Section 258, the Court had power to entertain the petition under Section 244 of the Civil Procedure Code. We are unable to accede to the contention of the learned Vakil for the respondents that, with reference to the terms of Section 244, the question raised by the petition could only be raised in answer to a claim made by the respondents on an application by them for execution. That section simply provides that questions arising between the parties to the suit and relating to the execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree shall be determined by order of the Court executing the decree and not by separate suit. We cannot construe the words "a Court executing a decree" as meaning, as contended on behalf of the respondents, that the section only covers cases of proceedings initiated by the decree-holder and does not include applications (relating to the execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree) made by the judgment-debtor.

5. Turning now to the merits of the case, in none of the cases cited in argumen