The main legal point established was that the provisions of Section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure did not apply to summons cases due to the misalignment of its requirements with the procedure of summons cases.

Walter Salis Schwabe, K.C., C.J.

1. This Criminal Revision case has been referred to the Full Bench on the question whether in summons cases the provisions of Section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, are to be applied, that is, is the Court bound, for the purpose of enabling the accused to explain the circumstances appearing in the evidence against him, to question him generally on the case after the witnesses for the prosecution have been examined and before he is called on for his defence. The inconvenience of this course is manifest in view of the pro visions of Section 364 of the Code of Criminal Procedure which re quire the taking down of any such question in full in the language in which the accused is examined, or, where that is not practicable, in the language of the Court or in English, and that the record shall be shown or read to him and, if necessary, interpreted. The great majority of summons cases are of a petty nature and a strict application of the section must necessarily involve a consumption of a large amount of judicial time. We are reliably informed that it would involve a considerable increase in the Magistracy and that, in fact, the section has in practice in this Presidency not been treated as applying to summons cases. In Madras there is no authority on the point except that in two recent cases single judges have felt themselves bound to hold that the section does apply by reason of the decisions of the Benches of other Courts referred to below. In other Courts there is considerable weight of judicial authority in favour of the application of the section. In Emperor v. Fernandez (1921) I.L.R. 45 B. 672, Shaw and Crump, JJ., gave a direct decision on the point and it was followed in Emperor v. Gulabjan (1922) I.L.R. 46 B. 441, by Macleod, C.J. and Shaw, J., the former pointing out the inconvenience and suggesting legislation as a remedy. In Raghu Bhumji v. The King Emperor (1920) 5 Pat. L.J. 430, in which the point was unnecessary for decision as it was a Sessions Case, Sultan Ahmed, J., held that the application of Section 342 was obligatory in Sessions Cases and expressed his opinion that it did not apply to summons cases for reasons which I will refer to later, Mullick, J., holding that the section was not obligatory in Sessions Cases stated that he failed to see any difference between warrant and summons cases. On this case being referred to Jwala Prasad, j., he held that it was obligatory in Sessions cases and was clearly of opinion that it applied to summons cases. In Ghulam Rasul v. The King Emperor (1921) 6 Pat. L.J. 174, Adami and Bucknill, JJ., held that the section applied to summons cases. Emperor v. Fernandez (1921) I.L.R. 45 B. 672, had been reported in the meantime and the Court simply followed that decision. This case has also been followed by single judges in Lahore in Muhammad Baksh v. Emperor (1921) 65 I.C. 618, and in Patna mParameswar Lal Mitter v. Emperor (1921) 67 I.C. 616. It is open to this Bench to take a different view and we have to consider the matter for ourselves, of course, giving due weight to the authorities quoted above. Section 342 is one of the general provisions as to inquiries and trials, contained in Chapter XXIV, and, being a general provision, it must be applied to all cases, unless the special sections dealing with particular cases indicate that it is not intended to apply to them, or unless the words of the section itself give such indication. In my judgment, both these grounds of exception are to be found in respect of Summons Cases. Looking at Section 342 it is a condition that the questioning directed is to take place before the accused is called on for his defence. The calling on the accused for his defence has a definite meaning both in sessions and warrant cases under Sections 289 and 256, but when examining Chapter XX containing the provisions applying to summons cases, the expression is not used. The prisoner in these cases docs not "enter