The interpretation of court orders and the application of legal precedents play a crucial role in determining the revival of applications and supporting lower court decisions.

1. We first simply state the facts as the lower Appellate Court dealt with them. They are, that the decree-holder, here respondent, holds a preliminary decree for redemption dated 5th April 1913, he being a purchaser at a Court sale from the original mortgagor. The appellant is the mortgagee, against whom redemption is asked for. On 18th August 1913 the respondent made an application for a final decree. There was some discussion in the lower Appellate Court as to the nature of that application but before us it has been treated without dispute as one in execution. Whilst that application was pending, the mortgagee respondent sued to enforce his alleged right of pre-emption; and he obtained a decree recognising that right in the Court of first instance on 4th September 1914, the proceedings in the Appellate Court by which that decree was substantially confirmed, ending on 19th January 1916. Whilst this pre-emption suit was penning before the District Munsif, an injunction pendente lite was granted to restrain the further proceedings in the redemption suit and the passing of final decree. The lower Appellate Court has dealt with the case, allowing execution to proceed on the footing that this injuction remained in force until the end of pre-emption suit on 19th January 1916 in the High Court, and that the right to proceed with the application for a final decree revived on that date and the present application for final decree, whatever exact description be applied to it, was in time since it was made on 18th February 1918 within three years from the time when the right to apply accrued, the exclusion of the period covered by the injunction being legitimate.

2. That ground alone cannot justify the lower Courts decision, for it is clear with reference to Bolton v. London Sehoel Board (1878) 7 Ch. D. 766 : 47 L.J. Ch. 461 : 26 W.R. 549, and Chalavadt Kottah v. Poloori Alimelammah 31 M. 71 : 18 M.L.J. 46 : 3 M.L.T. 329, that an injunction granted pendente lite until the disposal of the suit or further orders will end in any case on the disposal of the suit or on any earlier date on which further orders may be passed, the reference to further orders not applying to anything after the disposal. Something was said before us on behalf of the respondents, doubtless on instructions and also with reference to the respondents affidavit re the wording of the injunction, the suggestion being that the disposal of the suit "and any further orders" not "or further orders" was the limit specified. We are not prepared to accept this on the material before us when no ad mission has been made by the appellant that the normal form of injunction was departed from in this case. The lower Appellate Courts decision must therefore, be supported, if at all, on other grounds.

3. In order to deal with these grounds a further reference to the circumstances is necessary. We may observe that we have found considerable difficulty in arriving at them. But we have endeavoured to do so, because the whole discussion turns on the meaning of the order of dismissal passed on 20th October 1913. Is the dismissal, which is undoubtedly considered to be taken literally as absolutely terminating the proceedings or is it, as the respondent says, to be taken in the wide sense, which unfortunately, in our opinion, has received general recognition, of mere termination for administrative or statistical purposes amounting only to a suspension of proceedings until some obstacle has been removed or some stage contemplated by the Court and parties has been reached? The respondent of course contends that the step contemplated was the final disposal of the pre-emption suit. We have on the materials before us to decide as best we may, what was the intention of the Court in its order. The difficulty arises from the fact, not only that certain further materials have been placed before us which were not before the lower Court but that we have felt considerable doubt referring to one i