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IN THE HIGH COURT OF MARAS
Ayling
The Taluk Board Dindigul, Through
Versus
Venkatarama Aiyar Died T.E. And
Decided On : 23 April, 1923
Land Rights - Grant of Land for School - Nattam Poramboke - [Section 261.2 F-4, Madras Village Sites Act] - The court discussed the legality of the grant of a plot of land for a girls school, considering the rights of the villagers to use the vacant land for agricultural purposes. The court referred to the common law of the country and previous judgments to determine the control of Grama Natham and the permissibility of such land use. The court concluded that the alleged customary rights of the villagers in the waste were not established.
Fact of the Case:
The appeal related to a plot of land, part of S. No. 261.2 F-4 in Solaikurichi village, Madura Taluq, granted to the Dindigul Taluq Board for building a girls school. The plaintiffs, representing villagers, claimed a right to use the land for agricultural purposes, arguing that the grant to the Taluk Board was illegal.
Finding of the Court:
The court found that the alleged customary rights of the villagers in the waste were not established, and the grant of the land for the school was legal.
Issues: The main issue was the legality of the grant of the land for a girls school and the rights of the villagers to use the vacant land for agricultural purposes.
Ratio Decidendi: The court concluded that the alleged customary rights of the villagers in the waste were not established, and the grant of the land for the school was legal.
Final Decision: The court set aside the decree of the lower appellate Court and restored the District Munsif's decree, dismissing the suit with costs throughout.
Key Points: - The court held that the grant of land (S. No. 261.2 F-4) for a girls school is legal, and the alleged customary rights of villagers in the waste were not established. (!) - It was not disputable that Nattam poramboke may be granted for building purposes, but villagers claimed rights incompatible with such a grant; the court examined whether such rights existed by custom or long enjoyment. (!) - The judgment discusses that customary rights or long-continued use must be reasonable, certain as to extent, and openly enjoyed; the evidence here was insufficient to establish a customary right or easement under the Easements Act. (!) (!) - The court found no fixed period or clear evidence to support a customary right arising from long enjoyment or grant, distinguishing between customary rights and customary easements. (!) (!) - Ex. A, an endorsement regarding keeping the land as threshing floor for public use, was not considered sufficient evidence of Government recognition or a fresh grant of rights to the villagers. (!) (!) - The final decision: the suit was dismissed; the District Munsif’s decree was restored, costs awarded. (!) - The lower appellate Court’s finding of a customary right was not sustained; the appellants succeeded in showing lack of established customary rights. (!) (!)
Ayling, J.
1. This appeal relates to a plot of land, 14 cents in extent, forming part of S. No. 261.2 F-4 in Solaikurichi village, Madura Taluq which measures 19-28 acres and is registered as Nattam (building site) poromboke. Most of the S. No. has already been built over, but 2.92 acres are still vacant and of this Government has granted the suit plot to the Dindigul Taluq Board (1st defendant) to build a girls school upon. The plaintiffs are villagers, who claim that they have a right to use the whole of the vacant land (including the suit site) for various agricultural purposes and plead that the grant to the Taluk Board is consequently illegal.
2. The sole question is as to the legality of the grant and on this the two lower Courts have come to opposite conclusions, the Subordinate Judge in first appeal deciding in favour of Plaintiffs.
3. It is not disputed that Nattam poramboke may properly be granted for the purpose specified; but plaintiffs claim a right vested in the villagers whom they represent incompatible with such a grant.
4. They say in para 5 of the plaint "from time immemorial this kalam poramboke has been in the undisturbed enjoyment of the ryots of the said villages" and they have been using it as of right for communal purposes as detailed hereunder. That the said site from time out of mind has been used and is now being used as a threshing floor for about 500 acres in times of harvest (kodai and kalam) for storing manure and green leaves, for stocking hay-staks immediately after the harvest, for drying paddy before they are taken to the granaries of the ryots for allowing their cattle, buffaloes, etc., amounting to 1,000 and more to stray and remain there before they are taken for grazing and for other incidental innumerable purposes connected with agricultural operations."
5. The lower Appellate Court finds as a fact that the villagers have been using the land for purposes mentioned in the plaint and proceeds. "The question is whether such enjoyment has given them the right asserted by them in the plaint of whether it was only as a matter of grace that the villagers were permitted such acts of enjoyment." He decides in favour of Plaintiffs.
6. It seems to me that whether the right claimed by the. Plaintiffs is based on custom or prescription, the enjoyment alleged is of too fugitive and patently permissive a kind to afford any support to it. There is probably, no village in the Presidency in which the unoccupied village site is not used for the purposes indicated. Such user does no harm to any one, and is unobjectionable until the land is wanted for its legitimate purpose. I do not propose to labour this point as it is sufficient to quote from the Judgment of a Bench of this Court (Benson and Bhashyam Iyengar, JJ.) dealing with an absolutely similar case The Collector of Godavari District on behalf of the Secretary of State for India in Council v. Jannavula Pedda Rengayya and Anr. (1903) 4 M.L.T.
440. "According to the common law of the country the control of Grama Natham vests in the Revenue authorities and they are at liberty to grant portions of it at their discretion to persons who apply for it for building purposes."
7. It is suggested as a ground of distinction that the use of the land as threshing floor, which is not specifically referred to by the learned Judges in that case though probably included, is a ground of distinction. It seems to me to differ in no way from the other uses set out in the plaint. Any flat hard piece of ground can be utilised as a threshing floor - and such user is of just the same character as the others.
8. Apart from the evidence of user, the only other evidence in plaintiffs favour to which we are referred is Ex. A, copy of an order of the Madura Tahsildar in 1902. It appears from this that about that time another portion of the same unoccupied natham poramboke had been set apart for building police lines and that on the ryots petitioning that this would be "an obstructio
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