1923 Supreme(Mad) 281
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MARAS
Odgers
Khaji Mir Majavath Alli
Versus
Khaji Mir Mujafar Alli And Anr.
Decided On : 26 August, 1923
Adverse possession of Khaji inam lands for over 12 years can confer prescriptive title against the holder of the office and his successors, as interpreted under Article 144 of the Limitation Act.
Headnote:
Khaji Inam Lands - Property Rights - [Article 144, Limitation Act] - The court discussed the adverse possession of Khaji inam lands and the prescriptive title acquired against the holder of the office and his successors. Key legal provisions such as Article 144 of the Limitation Act were interpreted to determine the acquisition of prescriptive title through adverse possession.
Fact of the Case:
The plaintiff sought to establish his right to half share in the properties of Joram Bi, with the defence claiming that the Khaji inam lands were inalienable and impartible. The court found that the possession of the lands was adverse and that the plaintiff acquired title to the land.
Finding of the Court:
The court found that the items in question became the property of Joram Bi and that the possession was adverse for over 30 years, leading to the plaintiff's entitlement to a half share.
Issues: The main issue was whether adverse possession of Khaji inam lands for over 12 years would confer prescriptive title against the holder of the office and his successors.
Ratio Decidendi: The court applied the principles established in previous cases such as Dhanushkotirayudu v. Venkayala Venkatarathnam and interpreted Article 144 of the Limitation Act to determine the acquisition of prescriptive title through adverse possession.
Final Decision: The court dismissed the appeal with costs, affirming the plaintiff's entitlement to a half share in the properties of Joram Bi.
Odgers, J.
1. The plaintiff brought the suit to establish his right to half share in the properties of one Joram Bi deceased. As to items 3-6 in the plaint schedule, the defence is raised that they originally formed Khaji inam lands and that such lands were in fact inalienable and impartible. The Munsif found that these items were the properties of Joram Bi and were liable to partition and gave plaintiff a decree. This was confirmed on Appeal by the District Judge. Joram Bi had been in possession for 40 years and the District Munsiff held that 1st defendant had failed to show that her enjoyment was permissive. He also held that the Khaji inams were divided among the several members of the Khaji family long long ago with the result that each member or group of members hold separate and defined shares. The District Judge also held that the several branches of the Khaji family were enjoying portions of the plaint items as their separate property. I am by no means certain that these findings are not sufficient to dispose of the appeal on the short ground that the Khaji inam lands have long ago become disannexed from the office and that the possessors have acquired an absolute right subject to any rights of resumption that Government might have. The case has however been argued before us on the law on the ground that Joram Bis possession cannot be considered to be adverse as the land in question always appertained to the holder of the office and was resumable by him at any time?
2. The first case cited for the appellant (1st defendant) is Vidyavaruthi v. Balusami Ayyar (1921) I.L.R. 44 831 : 41 M.L.J. 346 (P.C.).
3. There the possession sought to be declared adverse was continued by a series of leases each valid for the lifetime of the grantors. The possession was clearly permissive. In Jalandhar Thakur v. Jharula Das (1914) 27 M.L.J. 100 : 42 Cal. 244 (P.C.), it was decided that a person not qualified for an hereditary office had not taken possession of it by appropriating a share of the daily offerings to which he had acquired no title. Each such taking was a fresh actionable wrong. There was here no question of immoveable property or of adverse possession. In Kamalathammal v. Krishna Pillai (1910) 20 M.L.J. 783 all that was decided was that the 1st defendant had not acquired a right to the office by possession of the lands for over 12 years. It was also held that Gnanasambanda Pandara Sannadhi v. Velu Pandaram (1899) I.L.R. 23 M. 271 : 10 M.L.J. 29 (P.C.) had not overruled Mahomed v. Ganapati (1889) I.L.R. 13 M. 277.
4. Further reference will be made to those cases. In Dhanushkotirayudu v. Vankayala Venkatarathnam (1919) 38 M.L.J. 320 it was held that Article 144 applies to a case of this sort and that a person in adverse possession of lands annexed to the office of Karnam for over the statutory period acquires a prescriptive title against the holder of the office and his successors following Neelachalam v. Kamarazu (1904) 14 M.L.J. 438 and the Privy Council ruling in Gnansambanda Pandara Sannadhi v. Velu Pandaram (1899) I.L.R. 23 M. 271 : 10 M.L.J. 29 (P.C.). With regard to the latter case, the High Court in Velu Pandaram v. Gnanasambanda Pandara Sannadhi (1895) 19 M. 243 : 6 M.L.J. 39 had held that plaintiffs right was not barred as that suit was brought within 12 years of the accrual of the right. The Privy Council reversed this decision on the ground that the respondent Velu was only entitled as heir to his father Nataraja and the latters claim was barred as he had alienated to a purchaser whose possession was adverse. In Mahomed v. Ganapathi (1889) I.L.R. 13 M. 277 it was held that (p. 280 subject to the law of limitation...limitation). In this case the plaintiff sought to eject the defendant as holding under an invalid alienation made by plaintiffs predecessor in office. In Neelachaiam v. Kamarazu (1904) 14 M.L.J. 438, it was held that the Privy Council ruling in Gnanasambanda Pandara Sannadhi v. Velu Pandaram (1899) I