IN THE HIGH COURT OF MARAS
S C.J.
Public Prosecutor
Versus
Kandasami Thevan
Decided On : 12 October, 1923
Forgery - Money Order - Section 409, Indian Penal Code - A. I. R. 1922 Patna 73, A. I. R. 1923 Mad. 178 - The judgment discusses the evidence of forgery in a money order case, the relevance of thumb-marks, and the application of the ruling in Bazari Hajam v. King-Emperor. The court found the accused guilty of criminal breach of trust and emphasized the seriousness of the offense.
Fact of the Case:
The accused, a postman, was acquitted of charges relating to a money order. The evidence showed that the thumb-mark on the money order was a forgery, and the accused substituted his own thumb-mark for that of the payee. The court found that the accused committed criminal breach of trust.
Finding of the Court:
The court found the accused guilty of criminal breach of trust and emphasized the seriousness of the offense. The acquittal was set aside, and the accused was convicted under Section 409, I. P. C.
Issues: The issues revolved around the authenticity of the thumb-mark on the money order, the relevance of expert evidence, and the application of the ruling in Bazari Hajam v. King-Emperor.
Ratio Decidendi: The court emphasized the relevance of thumb-marks in determining the authenticity of the money order and rejected the application of the ruling in Bazari Hajam v. King-Emperor. The court found the accused guilty of criminal breach of trust based on the evidence.
Final Decision: The accused was convicted of criminal breach of trust and sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for three years.
Schwabe C.J.
1. This is an appeal by the Crown against the acquittal of the accused on charges relating to a money order which came to his hands in his capacity of postman. I am quite at a loss to understand how, on the face of the evidence, in this case, the learned Judge could have arrived at the conclusion at which he arrived. In my judgment, it is against all the evidence. He has given entirely wrong grounds from start to finish.
2. The facts are that Rs. 20 was sent to a woman called Muniammal by her daughter who was away in the Malay States. The money order, Exhibit C, purports on the face of it, to have been paid over to the lady P. W. 1 and to bear her left hand thumb-mark witnessed by a man called Doraiswami. The accused says that he received that document and the money from the local postmaster, took it to P. W. 1, paid the money to her and got her receipt by taking her thumb-mark witnessed by Doraiswami. It is perfectly clear on the evidence that he did nothing of the kind. There can be no doubt whatever that the witnesss signature is a forgery and there cannot be the slightest doubt that the thumb-mark on the document is not the thumb-mark of P. W. 1, hut is the thumb-mark of the postman himself, the accused. The learned Judge declines to act on what he describes as the evidence of an expert, that the thumb-mark on Exhibit C is similar to the thumb-mark of the accused. The evidence was not that it was similar, but it was that it was identical. He apparently accepts the evidence that the mark on Exhibit C has no resemblance to either of the thumb-marks of P. W. 1, but he suggests that it is possible that it was not her thumb-mark, but was her fingermark.
3. It is quite clear that the definite rule of the post office, well known to the accused, was that he is to take the loft thumb-mark of the person who cannot write. There was no evidence at all before the Court that there was any resemblance between this mark and the finger marks of P. W. I and, therefore, this suggestion is a figment of the learned Judges imagination. He further purports to follow a ruling in Bazari Hajam v. Ring-Emperor A. I. R. 1922 Patna 73 a case on which considerable doubt has already been thrown by this Court on other points in Public Prosecutor v. Veerammal A. I. R. 1923 Mad. 178 and the part on which he relies is a statement in the judgment of Bucknill, J., to the following effect:
The very fact of the taking of the thumb impression from an accused person for the purpose of possible manufacture of the evidence by which he could be incriminated is in itself sufficient to warrant one in setting aside the conviction upon the understanding and upon the assumption that such was not really a fair trial.
4. It was applied in this case by the learned Judge to certain impressions of the accuseds thumb-marks taken before the Magistrate. It really was unnecessary for anything that the learned Judge had to apply his mind to, because there were ample examples of the accuseds thumb marks without having recourse to that particular example which was excluded. But I think it is very desirable to say that I wholly disagree with the remark I have quoted from the judgment of Bucknill, J. Why the taking of the thumb-impression from an accused person should he described as being taken for the purpose of possible manufacture of the evidence, or on what principle of law a conviction based on the resemblance between that thumb impression and the thumb-impression on the document in question in the suit is to be set aside on the assumption that it was not a fair trial is beyond my comprehension.
5. It is enough for me to say that I see no objection in law at all to the taking of the accuseds thumb-mark, if the Judge thinks it relevant at any time; nor do I think that a conviction based on a comparison of the thumb-mark of the accused person with the thumb- mark on the document in question in suit is in the least objectionable. The question of identity of the thumb
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