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1924 Supreme(Mad) 87
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MARAS
Phillips
Kalyani Pillai
Versus
Thiruvenkatasami Iyengar
Decided On : 12 February, 1924
The executing Court cannot go behind the decree of the Privy Council.
Headnote:
Decree - Execution of Decree - Summary
Fact of the Case:
Objection to execution of a decree of the Privy Council, contention regarding deceased respondents, limitation for bringing on record legal representatives, and failure to consider objection to execution petition on the score of limitation.
Finding of the Court:
The court dismissed the appeal, holding that the deceased respondents must be considered as parties to the decree, the application to bring on record their legal representatives is not barred by limitation, and the executing Court cannot go behind the decree.
Issues: Objection to execution of decree, consideration of deceased respondents, limitation for bringing on record legal representatives, and failure to consider objection to execution petition on the score of limitation.
Ratio Decidendi: Section 23 of William IV, Ch. 41 cures the defect in the judgment regarding deceased respondents, Article 181 of the Limitation Act gives three years from the date when the right to apply accrued for bringing on record legal representatives, and the executing Court cannot go behind the decree.
Final Decision: The appeal is dismissed with costs.
Phillips, J.
1. Objection is taken by appellants to the execution of a decree of the Privy Council. It is first contended that, as three of the respondents were dead when the appeal was heard and judgment was pronounced, the decree against them is a nullity. Section 23 of William IV, Ch. 41, however, cures the defect in the judgment for it enacts that the order shall have full force and effect notwithstanding the death of any of the parties interested therein. Vide Deonandan Prasad Singh v. Janki Singh (1920) 5 PLJ 314. The deceased respondents must therefore be considered as parties to the decree notwithstanding their death before it was passed.
2. It is next urged that the application to bring on record their legal representatives is barred by limitation, being made more than three years after their death; but Article 181 of the Limitation Act gives three years from the date when the right to apply accrued. The right to imp lead parties to a decree cannot arise until the decree is passed. This objection must therefore fail.
3. The further argument that the Privy Council failed to consider another objection to the execution petition on the score of limitation ignores the fact that the Privy Council decree orders execution to proceed and the executing Court cannot go behind the decree.
4. The appeal is accordingly dismissed with costs.
