Victor Murray Coutts Trotter, C.J.

1. I desire to say not one word more than is necessary for the decision of this case, because I am free to admit that I do not understand what the judgment of their Lordships of the Privy Council in Vidya Varuthi Thirtha v. Baluswami Iyer (1921) ILR 44 M 831 : 41 MLJ 346 enjoins upon us; but it appears to me that this much is clear that the real line of cleavage in this case is Are we to treat this instrument as being absolutely clear and, therefore fettering us in its construction, or as something capable of passing a qualified estate in the property to the tenant ? It is quite common for persons in the position of trustees of religious and charitable endowments to make lease of such property, and the common current of decisions in this presidency has always been to recognise those as being valid for the life of the lessor or the trustee, or, what is equivalent to his life, his continuance in the trust and to construe words apparently wider in import as limited to the lifetime of the lessor qua trustee. That is what we propose to do here. There are no extravagant words in this instrument indicating a permanent lease such as mulgeni, etc.,