Coutts-Trotter, C.J.

1. This case furnishes a single instance of the mischievous tendency of the Courts in this country to evade or endeavour to evade, plain statutory mandates, and in no sphere of the law, so far as I have observed, has that tendency been more freely exercised than in that branch of the law we are concerned with, in the present case, namely, the law of limitation. The way in which this matter stands is as follows:

2. In October 1913, a decree was obtained in a suit in which the plaintiffs were a father and his three sons, and the three sons were described on the face of the proceedings as suing through their next friend and guardian, the first plaintiff (that is, the father). Two months after that decree the father died and it was not until December of the following year 1914, that the eldest of the three sons attained his majority.

3. On the 3rd December 1917, well within three years of the attainment of majority, an execution application was taken out. It is said that that application was barred, because time must be taken to have run not from the attainment of majority of the eldest son, but from the date of the decree itself, i.e., 1913, The reason for it