The authority of a Receiver to enter into a completed contract and the Court's power to confirm a sale in Court sales.

1. This is an appeal against the order of the Subordinate Judge of Mayavaram refusing to accept the bid of Rathnasami Pillai, the appellant, for taking on lease certain property, the subject-matter of a suit before the Court, and directing a re-sale. What happened was, the Receiver, who had been appointed in the suit, was directed by the Court to sell by public auction the lease of certain lands in suit for a year. The conditions of sale were printed and the printed leaflets were circulated. The Receiver held an auction in which the appellant before us, Rathnasami Pillai, was the highest bidder. When the matter was taken to the Sub-Judge for confirmation, he refused to accept Rathnasami Pillais bid and directed a re-sale. It is against that order that this appeal is filed.

2 The appellant contends that a completed contract had been entered into with him by the Receiver and that the Court should, therefore, have directed a lease to be executed in his favour in the terms of his bid. At the re-sale ordered, the second respondent took the lease at a higher rate. A preliminary objection has been raised to this appeal that no appeal lies. The appeal has been filed under Order XLIII, Rule 1, Clause (s) as against an order under Order XL, Rule I, Civil Procedure Code. We need not, however, decide this question, as we think that, on the merits, the appellant has no ease. The Receiver is an Officer of Court and whatever powers he exercises are delegated powers of the Court which the Court expressly gives him. He has no nowers except what the Court grants him. Unless the appellant can show us that in this case the Court has delegated its power of entering into a completed contract with third parties to the Receiver, any action taken by the Receiver cannot be binding upon the Court or upon the properties. All that the appellant is able to show us is that he made the highest bid and that the published conditions of sale did not expressly state that the Hale was subject to the confirmation of the Court. The absence of such a statement cannot, in our opinion, be treated as implying that the Court had abandoned its power of confirming the sale before it would take effect. No doubt the ordinary rule regarding private auction is, that where an auction is held without any reservation, there is an implied condition that the highest bid will be accepted; but no authority has been cited to show that that rule applies to a sale by a Court Officer under the directions of Court. In Court sales, it is acceptance by the Court that constitutes the contract. See Surendro Keshub Roy v. Doorgasoondery Dassee (1888) 15 Cal. 253. The person who asserts that the Court Officer had power to bind the Court by his acceptance of a bid must prove it. The appellant has not been able to refer us to any evidence to show that such a power had been granted by the Court in this case. We must, therefore, hold that the Court bad ample authority as no contract had been concluded with him and the Courts order directing a re-sale was within its powers. The appeal fails and is dismissed with costs (costs one set).

3. C.R.P. No. 943 of 1923 is dismissed with costs.