The main legal point established in the judgment is that when property is placed in custodia legis by the appointment of a receiver, the orders passed by the Court for the management of such property will be binding on all parties who have submitted themselves to such management by the Court.

Spencer, Og.C.J.

1. The appellant holds a first mortgage over the machinery type and other stock-in-trade of the Modern Printing Press which is installed in premises belonging to the first respondent. The 1st respondent has a decree for arrears of rent and for ejectment of the tenant against the 2nd respondent. 3rd respondent is a Receiver appointed in the course of the execution of the 1st respondents decree and was directed by the Court in presence of all the parties to sell the press for the best price obtainable and meanwhile to keep it running as a going concern and to pay the rent due to the landlord. Owing to various reasons the attempt to dispose of the press as a going concern was unsuccessful and the materials were eventually sold for Rs. 10,000 which is less than the sum due to the appellant on his mortgage decree of July 10,1924. a this appeal we were asked to declare that the appellants claim to the proceeds of the mortgaged property should be given precedence over the 1st respondent s chim for rent and over the disbursemonts made by the Official Receiver to workmen for keeping the press running as a going concern. It is argued for the appellant that his position as a secured creditor cannot be rendered worse by an order passed on a petition to which he was not a party, that the landlady can only pursue her remedy for rent against the printer and the Receiver, that his consent to the sale of the press free of encumbrances was given on condition that he should have the same right over the proceeds as he had over the property mortgaged to him, that the Receiver is not entitled to pay the rent out of the proceeds of the corpus, and that the order of Devadoss, J. was only to pay the rent out of the net collection.

2. The last plea is not well founded. In the affidavit of the 1st respondents agent it was suggested that the Court should direst the Receiver to pay the rent out of the gross collections. Bat the order of the Court dated 26bh February 1923 does not state from what source the Receiver should pay the rent. In his affidavit of July 1924, the appellant states that he understood Mr. Justice Devadosss order that the rent should be a first charge as meaning that it should only be paid after the secured creditors had been sattsued. Bat the reply affidavit of the 1st respondents assistant contains a sworn statement that Mr. Justice Devadoss refused to make any order for sale of the property unless the parties agreed that rent should be paid to the plaintiff as a first charge. Apart from any consideration as to what the parties understood the learned Judges rder to mean, it is very clear from the affidavits and order to which our attention has been drawn that the appellant, though not a party to the 1st respondents suit, became aware of the appointment of a Receiver and that he applied to the Court that the Receiver appointed in the 1st respondents suit should be appointed Receiver in his own mortgage suit O.S. No. 582 of 1923 and that he opposed the removal of the press from its present premises and asked that the defendant should be restrained by an injunction from removing it. He therefore acquiesced in the housing of the property in the 1st respondents premises and in the employment of a Receiver to preserve the property for the benefit of such parties as might be eventually held to have a prior right to it. It is clear that notice was given to his vakil before passing the order of 24th July 1923, to sell the plaint and machinery by public auction with the reserve price of Rs. 31,500 after rejecting an offer for Rs. 30,500. Kumaraswamy Sastri, J., decided that the appellant was estopped by his conduct from claiming that the landlady and the Receiver should go without satisfaction of their claims and I am clearly of opinion that the learned Judge was right. Appellant evidently acquiesced in the property being kept where it was and he took the benefit of its being preserved. He cannot now claim to have the pr