1924 Supreme(Mad) 589
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MARAS
Devadoss
Veeraraghavachariar
Versus
The Secretary Of State For India In
Decided On : 8 October, 1924
The Indian Legislature has the power to declare a purpose as a public purpose, and its declaration is conclusive. The Legislature also has the authority to frame laws for land acquisition.
Headnote:
Land Acquisition Act - Public Purpose - Section 6, Clause 3
Fact of the Case:
The Government acquired land for house sites for Panchamas in the Tanjore District under the Land Acquisition Act. The appellant challenged the acquisition, arguing that it was not for a public purpose and that Section 6, Clause 3, of the Act was ultra vires of the Indian Legislature.
Finding of the Court:
The Court held that the acquisition for house sites for Panchamas was for a public purpose as declared by the Legislature. It also found that Section 6, Clause 3, which made the Government's declaration conclusive evidence of the public purpose, was within the powers of the Indian Legislature.
Issues: The issues involved the public purpose of the acquisition and the validity of Section 6, Clause 3, of the Land Acquisition Act.
Ratio Decidendi: The Court determined that when the Legislature has declared a purpose to be a public purpose, it is conclusive and not open to challenge by a Municipal Court. It also emphasized the powers of the Indian Legislature to frame laws for land acquisition.
Final Decision: The appeal was dismissed, and the judgment governed the connected Second Appeals.
Devadoss, J.
1. S.A. No. 688 of 1921 : The first point raised in this Second Appeal is that the acquisition of house sites for Panchamas is not a public purpose and the Court can go into the question whether it is a public purpose or not notwithstanding the notification by the Government that the acquisition was for a public purpose. The second point raised is that Section 6, Clause 3, of the Land Acquisition Act of 1894 is ultra vires of Indian Legislature inasmuch as the clause states that the said declaration, meaning the declaration by the Government, shall be conclusive evidence that the land is needed for public purposes or for a company as the case may be. It is convenient to consider the first two points together.
2. The argument of Mr. Muthiah Mudaliar for the appellant is that by enacting the provision in Clause 3 of Section 6 that the declaration shall be conclusive evidence, that the land is needed for public purposes or for a company, the Indian Legislature has taken away the right of suit by the party and that Courts are not precluded from considering whether the purpose for which the lands are acquired under the Land Acquisition Act is a public purpose or not and if it is not a public purpose the mere declaration by the Government that it is a public purpose would not make the acquisition legal. It is not contended on behalf of the respondent that the right of suit has been taken away by Clause 3 of Section 6. All that Section 6 (3) declares is that if the Government declares that a certain purpose for which it wants to acquire the lands is a public purpose, it shall be conclusive evidence of the fact.
3. The provision in Section 6 (3) that the declaration shall be conclusive evidence is not a new provision enacted in 1894. In Act XX of 1852, Section 1, there is a provision similar to this Section 1 is in these terms: "Whenever it shall appear to the Governor of Fort Saint George in Council that any land is needed for a public purpose, he shall make a declaration to that effect in a minute of Council and such a declaration shall be conclusive evidence that the purpose for which the land is needed is for a public purpose." A similar provision was enacted in Act VI of 1857, Section 2 : "The Government may take any land on a simple declaration under the signature of a Secretary that it is required for public purposes." This power the Legislature had before the Government of India Act, 1858, and it cannot be said that the Indian Legislature enacted a provision that it had no power to enact before the Government of India Act of 1858. The Government of India Act conferred upon the Indian Legislature the powers which it had when the Government was under the East India Company. That being so, it cannot be said, that the provision in Section 6 (3) is ultra vines of the Indian Legislature.
4. Before discussing the cases quoted on either side, it is best to consider what has been done by the Government. The Panchamas, the farm labourers of the Tanjore District, have been living on lands belonging to the Mirasidars or owners of the lands. They had no rights to the sites on which they built their houses and they were liable to be evicted or turned out at the will and pleasure of the landlord. In order to improve the condition of the Panchamas, the Government proposed to acquire the sites and parcel them out to those who were willing to build houses on the sites. With this object the Government appointed a Deputy Collector to acquire sites in the Tanjore District. He acquired land under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act and the plaintiff is one of those persons whose land has been acquired for house sites for the Panchamas. He has brought this suit for a declaration that the acquisition is illegal. Clause (f) of Section 3 of the Land Acquisition Act defines a public purpose as including "the provision of village sites in districts in which the Local Government shall have declared by notification in the Official G