Devadoss, J.

1. The first point argued in this second appeal is that the suit is barred by limitation.

2. Both the courts have held that Article 97 of the Limitation Act applies to the case, but Mr. Satyanarayana contends that Article 62 applies. In this case the plaintiff was actually in possession of the property on the date of the sale, which was on 264-1909. The property which he purchased was a carpenter-blacksmith inam. Defendants 3 and 4 were appointed as village blacksmiths and they brought a suit in the revenue court for possession and a decree was given on 26-5-17. Possession was actually given to defendants 3 and 4 on 7-9-1918. Both the Courts have held that limitation began to run only from the date on which the plaintiff was dispossessed of the property i.e., 7-9-18. The suit was brought on 1-9-18. Now the contention of the appellant is that the sale itself was void ab initio and the period of limitation must be calculated from the date of the sale i.e. 26-4-09 and the relies upon Section 5 of Act III of 1895. Under that section a village service inam cannot be transferred either by act of parties or through court. But it does not prevent a person who is the vill