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1924 Supreme(Mad) 658

IN THE HIGH COURT OF MARAS
M Nair
Peria Koil Kelvi Appan Govinda
Versus
Mahomed Esoof Sahib
Decided On : 27 October, 1924

The onus of establishing title to property by reason of possession for a certain requisite period lies upon the person asserting such possession.

Headnote:

Limitation Act - Possession - Article 142, Article 144 - The court discussed the application of Article 142 and Article 144 of the Limitation Act in the context of possession of immovable property. The court emphasized the principles of dispossession and discontinuance of possession and the onus of establishing title to property by reason of possession for a certain requisite period. The court also highlighted the need for adequacy, continuity, and exclusiveness in adverse possession.

Fact of the Case:

The plaintiff filed a suit to establish his right to the suit-land and for recovery of its possession from the defendants. The lower court found in favor of the plaintiff, but the Subordinate Judge dismissed the suit based on possession and adverse possession issues.

Finding of the Court:

The court found that the Subordinate Judge erred in applying Article 142 of the Limitation Act and that the true article to be applied to the case was Article 144. The court also emphasized the onus of establishing title to property by reason of possession for a certain requisite period.

Issues: The issues raised were the validity of the plaint lease, the plaintiff's possession of a valid title to the suit property, and whether the suit was barred by limitation under Article 144 of the Limitation Act.

Ratio Decidendi: The court emphasized the principles of dispossession and discontinuance of possession, the onus of establishing title to property by reason of possession, and the need for adequacy, continuity, and exclusiveness in adverse possession.

Final Decision: The court accepted the finding of the lower court, reversed the Subordinate Judge's decree, and restored the decree of the District Munsif, with costs here and in the Court below.

JUDGMENT

Madhavan Nair, J.

1. The plaintiff, appellant, instituted a suit, for establishing his right to the suit-land and for recovery of its possession from the defendants. He alleged in the plaint that the land belonged to the Devasthanam, of which he was the Dharmakartha, that it was leased to the father of the defendant and that when possession was demanded of them it was refused. The contesting defendant viz., the 2nd defendant, claimed the land as his own, as he and his ancestors enjoyed, it, for more than 50 years, as owners without any objection. On these pleadings, three issues were raised, namely : (1) Is the plaint lease true? (2) Does the plaintiff possess a valid title to the suit property? and (3) Is the suit barred by limitation under Article 144 of the Limitation Act? The District Munsif found in favour of the plaintiff, on all these issues and gave him a decree. On appeal by the 2nd defendant, the Subordinate Judge held that the property belonged to the plaint Devasthanam, but that the lease alleged was not proved. As regards the question of possession raised in the case, he set down two points for determination; Point No. 3:

Whether the plaintiff was in possession of the land within twelve years before suit?

and Point No. 4:

Whether he (2nd defendant) and his ancestors have been in adverse possession for over twelve years.

2. On both these points, he found against the plaintiff and, in the result, dismissed his suit.

3. It is argued before me that, in considering the question of limitation, namely Point No. 3, the Subordinate Judge has erred in applying Article 142 of the Limitation Act, to the facts of this case and that as regards adverse possession raised in Point No. 4, his conclusion is not based upon the evidence but on pure surmises. I think the contentions of the learned vakil for the appellant on both these points are well founded. Article 142 runs as follows:

For possession of immovable property, when the plaintiff, while in possession of the property, has been dispossessed, or has discontinued the possession - twelve years - the date of the dispossession or discontinuance.

4. The starting point for limitation under this Article is the date of dispossession or discontinuance. In M Donnell v. MKinty [1847] 10 Ir. L.R. 514, Blackburn, CJ., states that the word discontinuance of possession in the statute means an abandonment of possession by one person, followed by the actual possession of another person : for if no one succeeded, to the possession created or abandoned, there could be no one in whose favour or for whose protection the statute could operate. To constitute discontinuance, there must both be dereliction by the person who has the right, and actual possession, whether adverse or not, to be protected.

5. In Smith v. Lloyd 156 E.R.P. 240 Baron Parke laid down the law as follows:

We are clearly of opinion that the statute applies not to cases of want of actual possession by the plaintiff, but rd cases where he has been out of, and another in, possession for the prescribed time. There must be both absence of possession by the person who has the right, and actual possession by another, whether adverse or not, to be protected, to bring the case within the statute. We entirely concur in the judgment of Blackburn, C.J., in MDonnel v. Kinty [1847] 10 Ir. L.R. 514 and the principle on which it is founded.

6. The principle laid down in these decisions, was accepted in the well-known case of Agency Co. v. Short [1888] 13 A.C. 793 (P.C.), which was followed by the Judicial Committee in The Secretary of State for India v. Krishnamoni Gupta [1902] 29 Cal. 518. In the words of Mookherjee, J., in Brojendra Kishore Roy Choudhury v. Sarojini Ray [1915] 20 C.W.N. 481, "Dispossession" implies the coming in of a person and the driving out of another from possession. "Discontinuance implies the going out of the person in possession and his being followed into possession by another." See also Charu v. Nahush A.I.R. 1923 Cal.











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