IN THE HIGH COURT OF MARAS
Devadoss
Kakaraparti Punnayya
Versus
Chilakalapudi Venkatappa Rao
Decided On : 7 November, 1924
Limitation - Hypothecation - Limitation Act, Transfer of Property Act - Article 36, Section 66 - The court discussed the applicability of the Limitation Act and the Transfer of Property Act in a case involving a hypothecation. It emphasized the definition of immovable property and the implications of the sale of a house with an option to pull it down. The court also highlighted the liability of the vendee if the mortgaged property is converted or destroyed. The judgment provides a comprehensive interpretation of the legal provisions and their influence on the court's decision.
Fact of the Case:
The plaintiff's suit is based on a hypothecation executed by the 1st defendant, with the 2nd defendant impleaded as he purchased the hypothecated house. The lower courts granted a mortgage decree in favor of the plaintiff against both defendants.
Finding of the Court:
The court held that the suit was not barred by limitation and emphasized that the sale of the house constituted immovable property. It also established the liability of the vendee if the mortgaged property is converted or destroyed.
Issues: The main issue revolved around the applicability of the Limitation Act and the nature of the property sold in the case.
Ratio Decidendi: The court's decision was based on the interpretation of the legal provisions related to immovable property, the liability of the vendee, and the proper article of the Limitation Act applicable to the case.
Final Decision: The second appeal failed and was dismissed with costs.
Devadoss, J.
1. The plantiffs suit is on a hypothection on executed by the 1st defendant on 16th May 1908. The 2nd defendant is impleaded on the ground that he purchased the hypothecated house after the date of the hypothecation bond. Both the lower Courts have given a mortgage decree in favour of the plaintiff against both the defendants. The 2nd defendant pleaded in his written statements that the 1st defendant ant sold only the house to his father and not the site for a debt due by the defendant to his father. It is unnecessary for the purposes of this case to consider whether the purchase of the house was by the 2nd defendant or by his father.
2. The contention of Mr. Krishna Menon for the appellant is that the suit is barred by limitation inasmuch as it is brought more than three year from the date of the sale to the 2nd defendants father. His argument is that the 2nd defendants father purchased only the materials of the house and that Article 36 of the First Schedule of the Limitation Act is the proper article applicable to the case. Before considering the contention it is necessary to make it clear what was it that was actually sold by the 1st defendant to the 2nd defendants father. Exhibit 1 is the document under which the sale was effected. It is dated 12th January 1910. It is headed "Sale deed of moveable property for sum of Rs. 500." What was conveyed under document was the site and " all the wood materials, brick, walls, foundation etc., belonging to the house of 14 full gadees built of brick-walls herein and the different kinds of materials belonging to the said house." In the body of the document the recital is : " Therefore henceforward you, your heirs and representatives may enjoy the said property as you please and we, our heirs and representatives will never raise any dispute in respect of the same." Reading the document as a whole it is quite clear that which was conveyed under it was the house and not the materials of the house after it was pulled down. It is admitted that when the sale deed was executed, the house was standing on the site. The 2nd defendants contention is that it was pulled down after the purchase and the materials were sold or utilized by him. When the house was sold, granting that under the document this, superstructure alone was sold, the sale was a sale of immovable property ; for the house was built on foundations laid in the earth and the house, therefore, is immovable property even though it was conveyed apart from the site on which it stood. The expression immovable property is defined in the General Clauses Act thus : " Immovable property shall include land, benefits to arise out of land, and things attached to the earth, or permanently fastened to anything attached to the earth." According to the Indian registration Act XVI of 1908 immovable property includes land, buildings...and things attached to the earth or permanently fastened to anything which is attached to the earth, but not standing timber, growing crops nor grass." In the Transfer of Property Act immovable property does not include standing timber, growing crops or grass. It is clear from the definition of the expression "immovable property " in the three Acts that a house which is built on a site with fondations laid in it is immoveable property. A house which is sold for the purpose of enjoyment as a house with an option to pull it down if the vendee likes, is immovable property for the purposes of the Transfer of Property Act.
3. Mr. Krishna Menons argument is that the object of the sale was for the purpose of allowing the vendee to remove the materials of the house by pulling it down and, therefore, the sale is of moveable property. I am not satisfied that that was the intention of the parties to Ex. 1. Granting for arguments sake that the intention of parties was that the house should be pulled down and the materials should be removed by the vendee even then, what was sold was the house and not the materials
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