The central legal point established in the judgment is the interpretation of the expression 'suit for land' and its application to the present suit.

Coutts-Trotter, C.J.

1. No one, it seems to me, using language in its natural sense would ever think of describing this plaint (after the excision of two prayers which Mr. Grant gave up) as being a suit for land. But it is said that there are decisions of this and other Courts which compel such a construction to be put upon those words as would bring the present suit within them. It is sufficient for me to say that I do not think that any of the authorities cited has that effect. I only desire to say one thing, and that is chiefly in reference to the case of Srinivasa Aiyangar v. Kannappa Chetti 33 Ind. Cas. 906 : 30 M.L.J. 120. If that case is to he supposed to say that you are entitled to look at the amended C.P.C. for the purpose of construing the words of the earlier Statute, namely, the Letters Patent with which we are concerned, I do not agree with it. But I am by no means convinced that; that case is an authority for the pure position for which it was cited. The appeal must be dismissed. The appellant will pay plaintiffs-respondents costs. The memorandum of objections is dismissed, no order as to costs.

Srinivasa Iyengar, J.

2. The expression "suit for land" it seems to me must be construed as an action, the primary object of which is to establish claims regarding the title to property or possession of property and no suit can be described as a suit for land as the result of the decision in which the little to, or possession of immoveable property will not in any manner or measure be directly affected. Further, the proposition "for" in the expression "suit for land" would seem to indicate that the title to or possession of, immoveable property must be the primary object of the action. A suit for an office or for the removal of a person from an office is a well-known form of action. This is a suit merely for the accounts of the management of a trust and for the administration of a trust. The decision of this Court, confirmed by the Privy Council in the case of Srinivasa Moorthy v. Venkatavarada Iyengar 11 Ind. Cas. 447 : 34 M. 257 : 15 C.W.N. 741 : 8 A.L.J. 774 : 13 Bom. L.R. 520 : (1911) 2 M.W.N. 375 : 14 : C.L.J. 64 : 21 M.L.J. 669 : 10 M.L.T. 263 (P.C.) is that an action for administration of an estate is not a suit for land, even though the whole of the immoveable property belonging to the estate may be outside the local limits of the Court. I do not see how on principle the present suit differs from an administration action. This being a suit for an account of the management of a trust by the first and second defendants and really a suit for the administration of a trust referred to in the plaint, it seems to me that the same principle applies and it cannot possibly be described as a "suit for land," and, therefore, excluded from the jurisdiction of this Court. The learned Judge was right in that decision; I may also add that the original application made on behalf of the first defendant to the learned Judge was to revoke the leave to sue granted by the Court. Leave to sue could not possibly have been granted in a case in which the whole of the property, the subject-matter of the suit, was outside the jurisdiction if the suit was a suit for land. Leave to sue was applied for and obtained in this case, because all the defendants did not reside within the jurisdiction and part of the cause of action may be said to have arisen beyond the jurisdiction of this Court. That leave to sue was granted in the first instance ex parte. To revoke that leave would not be to confer or take away any jurisdiction possessed by the Court in respect of the suit if it was a suit for land. Even if the order of the learned Judge refusing to revoke the leave to sue be set aside, the question would still remain, whether this Court had jurisdiction in respect of the suit. But Mr. Grant on behalf of the respondent, intimated that this appeal might be dealt with, as though it was an appeal from a decision on a preliminary question whether