Krishnan, J.

1. In this case, the plaintiff obtained a compromise decree, by which if money was paid within the 30th Meenom 1907 (12th April, 1922) the sum of Rs. 285 was to be taken in full satisfaction of the claim. The decree provided that in default of such payment, the defendants were to pay the plaintiff the whole of the plaint amount with costs. The defendant put in an application to the lower Court to have satisfaction entered of the decree, on the ground that he tendered the amount of Rs. 285 to the plaintiff on the 12th April, 1922, but as the plaintiff did not receive that amount, he sent it by money order to the plaintiff, which again was refused and he therefore had the money ready with him to be deposited in Court and to give, a chellan to make that deposit. That was on the reopening day of the Court, after the midsummer holidays, on the 12th June 1922. The chellan was granted and the money was deposited, on the re-opening day. The lower Court has found that the alleged tender out of Court is not true and in Revision, I must accept that finding. But it has not considered the question whether the deposit into Court on the re-opening day was not a sufficient compliance with the terms of the decree. No doubt the compromise decree says that the money is to be paid to the plaintiff. But when a decree directs money to be paid to a party, Order 21, Rule 1, Civil Procedure Code, lays down that money shall be paid either to the party in person, or shall be deposited into Court. The defendant therefore in this ease had the option either of paying the money to the plaintiff, or of depositing the money into Court; and if he had deposited it into Court before 12th April, no question could have arisen and the defendant would have been held to have complied with the terms of the decree. Having had that option, the question then is whether the defendants were not in time, when they deposited the money at the earliest possible opportunity into Court. As 12th April was a holiday, the mid-summer recess having commenced by that time, the earliest day on which 179 the money could be paid into Court, after the 12th April, was the 12th June, and the defendant complied with that condition. It seems to me, therefore, that there was a sufficient compliance with the decree, on the part of the defendant and that the lower Court should have directed the money to be paid over to the plaintiff and entered up satisfaction of the decree. A question similar to this arose in Bombay and it was held by the learned Judges of the Bombay High Court, in Wana Mard Ravji v. Natu Walad Murha (1911) 35 Bom. 35, that if the plaintiff chose to pay the money into Court, he found that the Court was closed on the due date and he paid it on the earliest day, on which the Court reopened, such a payment would be a proper compliance with the terms of the decree, for Order 21, Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Code says that the payment may be made into Court, or into the hands of the party. It is contended that this ruling should not be relied upon by me, because the learned Judges of the Bombay High Court have misapplied Section 10 of the General Clauses Act. It is quite true that the General Clauses Act deals with the general rules of construction of statutes and the words of Section 10 can hardly be applied to a case, where a certain thing is directed to be done by a decree of Court. But as pointed out in Sambasiva Chari v. Ramasami Reddi (1899) 22 Mad. 1, there is a generally recognised principle of law, under which parties, who are prevented from doing a thing, not by any default of their own, but by the Court itself, are entitled to do it, at the first subsequent opportunity. That is the general principle of equity, quite apart from the terms of Section 10 of the General Clauses Act. In fact Section 10 is based upon that principle. In this case, the defendant had the option to pay either to the plaintiff directly or into Court. He was entitled to choose bet