The main legal principle established was that the doctrine of lis pendens does not apply to a document creating title in immovable property executed before the filing of the suit but registered after.

1. The only point raised in this Letters Patent appeal is "Is a sale-deed executed before but registered after the filing of a suit affected by the doctrine of lis pendens"?

2. The contention of Mr. Narasimhachari for the appellant is that on the date of the filing of the plaint, the property had not passed to the plaintiff inasmuch as the sale-deed was not registered and that the registration of the sale-deed, subsequent to the filing of the plaint, amounted to a transfer of the property in suit and, therefore, Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act applies to the case. In the case of a conveyance or a document creating title to immoveable property, registration is necessary to give validity to "such document but the question is whether a document creates title from the date of its execution or whether it creates title only from the date of its registration. Section 47 of the Indian Registration Act makes it clear that a registered document shall operate from the time from which it would have commenced to operate if no registration thereof had been required or made, and not from the time of its registration." In a competition between two documents creating title to immoveable property, the document earlier in date has precedence over another document later in date but registered before the former document. It is not the registration of a document which operates to create title but it is the document itself. The Registration Act makes valid such documents as soon as they are registered but the right conveyed or transferred is the right which exists in the transferor on the date of the document. When the document is presented for registration, the executant simply admits execution whereupon the document is registered and if the executant does not admit execution or if he refuses to appear before the Registrar, the law provides for compulsory registration of the document. In such a case it cannot be said that the executant by any act of his gives validity to the document.

3. The contention of Mr. Narasimhachari is that a sale can be effected only by a registered instrument and that before the date of registration there was no sale and, therefore, the suit which was filed before the date of registration does stand in the way of the executant registering the document. This argument overlooks the fact that the vendee has a right to compel a vendor to execute a sale-deed in his favour and if he refuses, to ask the Court to execute the document. If a document has already been executed, he could present it for registration within four months and if no document has been executed he could sue for specific performance of the contract of sale. Such a contract would not be affected by the doctrine of lis pendens on account of the filing of a suit subsequent to its date.

4. Under Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act any transfer or other dealing with the property in a suit or proceeding is affected by the doctrine of lis pendens Mere registration of the document cannot be said to be a transfer of the property or dealing the property in suit Section 52 therefore, can have no application to the present case where the sale-deed was executed before the date of the filing of the suit.

5. Mr. Narasimhachariar relies upon the case of Tilkdhari Singh v. Gour Narain 59 Ind. Cas. 290 : 5 P.L.J. 715 : 2 P.L.T. 95 : (1921) Pat. 122. There the learned Judges held that a mortgage executed before a suit was filed in respect of the property covered by the mortgage but registered after the filing of the suit was affected by the doctrine of lis pendens. With great respect we are unable to agree with the reasoning of the learned Judges. They rely upon the case of Ram Prasad v. Bhikari Das 26 A. 464 : A.W.N. (1904) 108 as fully supporting the view they take. There was no question of the doctrine of lis pendens in the case in Ram Prasad v. Bhikari Das 26 A. 464 : A.W.N. (1904) 108 and it is difficult to see how that case could support the reasonin